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EPHEDRA AND THE FAILURE OF DIETARY
SUPPLEMENT REGULATION
Michael Sachs'
On Sunday, August 17, 2003, in front of friends, family, and some of
her deceased husband's former teammates, a solemn Kiley Bechler
spread the ashes of her husband, Steve Bechler, on the three pitching
mounds in Oriole Park at Camden Yards. This was a far cry from the
scenario in which they had pictured Steve taking the mound at Camden
Yards and etching his name into Orioles folklore.2 As a young boy
growing up in Medford, Oregon, Steve Bechler dreamed of one day
pitching in the Major Leagues. His dream came true when he made
three relief appearances for the Baltimore Orioles in the summer of
2002.4 Steve reported to spring training the following season weighing
250 pounds, ten pounds over his projected weight.5 In order to help shed
the excess weight and enhance his chances of staying with the major
league team, Steve took a dietary supplement called Xenadrine RFA-1,
manufactured by Cytodyne.6 The main ingredient in Xenadrine is
' J.D. Candidate, May 2005, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law. The author would like to thank his family for their support, Professor Helen M.
Alvare for her substantive edits, and the members of the Catholic University Law Review,
particularly Daniel Roque, Edward Meyers, and Wesley Dunn, whose comprehensive
editing made the publishing of this paper possible.
1. See Thorn Loverro, Bechler Has Eternal Presence at Camden, WASH. TIMES, Aug.
18, 2003, at C1.
2. See id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Issues Relating to Ephedra-Containing Dietary Supplements: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations and the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, &
Consumer Prot. of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Congress 67 (2003)
[hereinafter Ephedra-Containing Supplements Hearings] (testimony of Pat Bechler); id. at
132 (statement of Rep. Greg Walden, Vice Chairman, Comm. on Energy & Commerce).
Pat Bechler testified that her son reported to spring training ten pounds overweight, but
with a lower percentage of body fat than the previous year. Id. at 67.
6. See Loverro, supra note 1. In addition to being implicated in the death of Steve
Bechler, Cytodyne is currently being sued for the role of its product in the death of
Rashidi Wheeler, a Northwestern University football player who died of heatstroke during
summer workouts in 2001. Guy Gugliotta & Amy Shipley, Ephedra Controversy Nothing
New in Sports: Dietary Supplements Linked to Other Deaths, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 2003,
at D4.
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ephedra, an herbal dietary supplement, which according to the autopsy
report, contributed to Steve's death .
Ephedra is a plant species which has long been used for medicinal
purposes.8 The Chinese refer to ephedra as Ma Huang and have used it
for thousands of years to help cure ailments such as the common cold,
asthma, and other respiratory diseases.9 Plants of the ephedra species
may contain up to six types of alkaloids, the principle one being
7. See Loverro, supra note 1. Robert Chinery, the former President of Cytodyne
Technologies, testified in front of the House Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations that Cytodyne's doctors conducted their own review of Steve Bechler's
medical records and determined that Steve died of heat stroke which was caused by his
"morbid obesity, high blood pressure and heart disease, adverse weather conditions,
physical exertion and inadequate screening, monitoring and medical supervision [on
behalf of the Orioles training staff]." Ephedra-Containing Supplements Hearings, supra
note 5, at 107 (testimony of Robert Chinery, President, Cytodyne Technologic).
Representative Greg Walden (R-OR) responded to this argument by entering specific
evidence of Steve Bechler's official autopsy report into the record:
Dr. Baden noted correctly the patient weight at the time of the autopsy was 320
pounds and that he was 62" in height and therefore it concluded that he was
morbidly obese. However Dr. Baden admitted 2 important facts which were,
and I quote, "The fact that Mr. Bechler's weight 3 days before his demise was
250 pounds and no individual, no matter how much [he] would eat, can gain 70
pounds of weight in 3 days."
Furthermore, Mr. Bechler's gastrointestinal tract was empty. He ate very
little, if at all, during the 2 to 3 days preceding his demise. At the time of the
autopsy Mr. Bechler was excessively bloated and deamatose. This bloating was a
result of both infusion of resuscitation fluids and his kidney failure with lack of
urination.
I think it is terribly misleading to use the terminology that was used to say
that part of his death was caused by severe obesity. He was 10 pounds
overweight 3 days before.
Id. at 132.
8. Stephen Bent et al., The Relative Safety of Ephedra Compared with Other Herbal
Products, 138 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 468, 468 (2003) (noting that ephedra has been
used in herbal formulas for thousands of years and that in the 1920s, ephedra first became
popular in the United States as a stimulant, as a treatment for asthma, and as a nasal
decongestant). How far back the history of use of ephedra products goes has not been
determined; however, one report has noted that investigators found a species of ephedra
plant that had presumably been used medicinally in a Neanderthal grave. PAUL
SHEKELLE ET AL., S. CAL. EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICE CTR., EPHEDRA AND
EPHEDRINE FOR WEIGHT Loss AND ATHLETIC PERFORMANCE ENHANCEMENT:
CLINICAL EFFICACY AND SIDE EFFECTS 7 (2003). This report (RAND Report) also
noted that "ephedra . . . gained notoriety during modern times when it was learned that
the drug was given parenterally to Japanese kamikaze pilots during World War II." Id. at
7.
9. See ANDREW GAEDDERT, EPHEDRA (MA HUANG), at http://www.
nycacupuncture.com/ephedra.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2004); see also Bent et al., supra
note 8.
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ephedrine.'0 According to a study in the Annals of Internal Medicine,
ephedra alkaloids are naturally occurring chemical stimulants that cause
numerous physiological responses in the body such as increased blood
pressure, heart rate, and brochodilation." Today, many people purchase
dietary supplements containing a botanical form of ephedra alkaloids as
a means to increase energy or lose weight. 2
The Federal Government regulates dietary supplements under the
Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994 (DSHEA).'3
DSHEA changed the existing regulatory framework for dietary
supplements in two ways: (1) it broadened the definition of dietary
supplements; and (2) it decreased the Food and Drug Administration's
(FDA) ability to regulate dietary supplements by providing them with a
presumption of safety, placing the burden on the FDA to prove
otherwise. 4 This combination of increasing the number of substances
considered to be dietary supplements, while decreasing the FDA's
regulatory ability, has led to the production and distribution of a plethora
of dietary supplements that do not require premarket approval by the
10. Bent et al., supra note 8. Ephedra contains other alkaloids in addition to
ephedrine such as pseudophedrine, phenylpropanolamine, methylephedrine,
methylpseudoephedrine, and norpseudoephedrine. Id. The alkaloid composition and
strength of a particular plant varies by "species and growing conditions such as geographic
location, altitude, and soil pH." See SHEKELLE ET AL., supra note 8.
11. Bent et al., supra note 8.
12. Id.
13. Pub. L. No. 103-417, 108 Stat. 4325 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
21 and 42 U.S.C.).
14. Tod L. Stewart, Getting High with a Little Help from the Feds: Federal Regulation
of Herbal Stimulants, 6 J. PHARMACY & L. 101, 107-08 (1997); Mcghan Colloton,
Comment, Dietary Supplements: A Challenge Facing the FDA in Mad Cow Disease
Prevention, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 495, 525, 527 (2002). Contra Dangers of Dietary
Supplements: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 108th Cong.
(2003), LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony [hereinafter
Dangers of Dietary Supplements Hearing] (testimony of David Seckman, Executive
Director and CEO, National Nutritional Foods Association) (arguing that "[the Dietary
Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994 (]DSHEA[)] is often mischaracterized as
lessening the Food and Drug Administration's ability to regulate supplements. In fact,...
[DSHEA] . . . increased [the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA)] enforcement
powers"); see also id. (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch, Chairman, Judiciary Comm.).
DSHEA did add three regulatory powers which the FDA did not previously have. See 21
U.S.C. § 342(f)(1)(A)-(C) (2000). However, this argument fails to account for the fact that
prior to DSHEA, there were fewer substances that fit into the statutory definition of
dietary supplements, and the FDA often regulated those that did as though they required
premarket approval. See infra Part I.A. Therefore, when DSHEA broadened the
definition of dietary supplements and definitively placed the burden on the FDA to
disprove the safety of all dietary supplements, it dramatically decreased the regulatory
power of the FDA. See infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
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FDA. 15 The current regulatory scheme for ephedra poses a substantial
health risk to Americans. For example, synthetic versions of ephedra
alkaloids are regulated as drugs, while botanical versions of ephedra
alkaloids are regulated as dietary supplements." This has created a
dichotomy in regulatory law where, even though dietary supplements
containing a combination of botanical ephedra and caffeine have the
exact same pharmacological effects in the body as a drug combination of
synthetic ephedrine and caffeine, the dietary supplement combination
product is legal and the drug combination is not."7 Recently, dietary
supplements containing caffeine and ephedra have been linked to a
growing number of deaths."' This contradictory regulation of ephedra
products presents a hazard to the public and highlights the limitations in
existing federal law.
This Comment examines the current state of federal regulation of
dietary supplements and discusses the limitations that current law
imposes on the FDA's ability to provide oversight of dietary
supplements. This Comment first traces the evolution of the current law
and the historical relationship between the U.S. Congress and the FDA
as it relates to the regulation of dietary supplements. This Comment
then focuses on the FDA's attempts to regulate products containing
15. See Colloton, supra note 14, at 527-28.
16. Ephedra- Containing Supplement Hearings, supra note 5, at 2 (statement of Rep.
Jim Greenwood, Chairman, Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations). In 1983, citing
health concerns, the belief that there were no legitimate uses for drugs containing a
combination of ephedrine and caffeine, and the fact that these products were being used
recreationally to mimic the effects of illegal drugs, the FDA banned the combination in
drug form. Enforcement Action Under the New Drug Provisions of the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act; Certain OTC Drug Products; Notice of Advisory Opinion, 48
Fed. Reg. 52,513, 52,513-14 (Nov. 18, 1983). Over-the-counter (OTC) and prescription
drugs that contain synthetic ephedrine are used "for temporary relief of shortness of
breath, chest tightness, and wheezing due to bronchial asthma. Synthetic ephedrine can
also be used as a topical nasal decongestant (nose drops, sprays, or jelly) for temporary
relief of nasal congestion due to colds, hay fever, sinusitis, or other upper respiratory
allergies." Michelle Meadows, Public Health Officials Caution Against Ephedra Use, FDA
CONSUMER MAG., May-June 2003, http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2003/303-ephedra
.html. However, a study in the New England Journal of Medicine noted that "ephedrine is
rarely prescribed today for medical purposes, because newer drugs have more specific
actions and fewer side effects." Christine A. Hailer & Neal L. Benowitz, Adverse
Cardiovascular and Central Nervous System Events Associated with Dietary Supplements
Containing Ephedra Alkaloids, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1833, 1838 (2000).
17. Ephedra-Containing Supplements Hearings, supra note 5, at 42 (statement of
Cynthia Culmo, former official, Texas Department of Health). Ms. Culmo testified that
"[b]y regulation drug products containing ephedrine cannot be combined with any other
stimulant, based upon the potential for abuse and safety concerns. Not so for dietary
supplements." Id.
18. See, e.g., infra note 148 (detailing the death of Sean Riggins from ingesting a
dietary supplement containing a combination of caffeine and ephedra).
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ephedra alkaloids under existing law. Next, this Comment examines
state government legislation attempting to ban the sale of ephedra
products. This Comment then analyzes the impact that DSHEA has had
on the FDA's ability to regulate ephedra effectively and the resulting
attempts by the state governments to step in where the Federal
Government has failed. Finally, this Comment proposes changes to the
existing regulatory scheme that would enable the public to have access to
dietary supplements while at the same time ensuring that the product is
safe.
I. THE HISTORY OF DIETARY SUPPLEMENT REGULATION
A. Dietary Supplement Regulation Prior to the Enactment of DSHEA
With the passage of the Pure Food Act (PFA) in 1906, Congress, for
the first time, attempted to ensure the safety and quality of food and
drugs. 9 The 1906 Act differentiated between a substance that was a
food, and one that was a drug, and prohibited the sale, shipment, or
receiving of adulterated or misbranded foods or drugs through interstate
commerce. 0 The role of the FDA, then called the Bureau of Chemistry,
a subsection of the Department of Agriculture, was to examine
questionable foods and drugs to determine whether they were
adulterated or misbranded under the PFA 1 If a product was deemed
19. Pub. L. No. 384, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (repealed 1938). See generally John
P. Swann, Food and Drug Administration, in A HISTORICAL GUIDE TO THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT 248, 248-53 (George T. Kurian ed., 1998).
20. See Swann, supra note 19, at 249-50. In § 7, the Pure Food Act of 1906 (PFA)
defined a drug to "include all medicines and preparations recognized in the United States
Pharmacopoeia or National Formulary for internal or external use, and any substance or
mixture of substances intended to be used for the cure, mitigation, or prevention of
disease of either man or other animals." 21 U.S.C. § 7 (1934) (repealed 1938). Section 7
also defined food to "include all articles used for food, drink, confectionary, or condiment
by man or other animals, whether simple, mixed, or compound." Id.
21. Swann, supra note 19, at 248-49. The FDA began as the Division of Chemistry
and, in 1901, became known as the Bureau of Chemistry. Id. at 249. In 1927, the Bureau
of Chemistry became known as the Food, Drug, and Insecticide Administration, and in
1930, the name was shorted to the present version, FDA. Id. The FDA originally was a
division of the Department of Agriculture; in 1940, it was moved to the Federal Security
Agency, where it remained until 1953 when it became part of the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (HEW). Id. In 1968, the FDA moved under the Public Health
Service, a division of HEW; in 1980, the FDA was moved to its present home, the
Department of Health and Human Services. Id. Under the 1906 Act, a drug was deemed
adulterated if it did not meet the standards for strength, quality, or purity as promulgated
in the U.S. Pharmacopoeia or National Formulary, unless the product accurately listed the
product's standard of strength, quality, or purity on its packaging if it differed from the
industry standard. 21 U.S.C. § 8 (1934) (repealed 1938). However, if the product's
standard of strength, quality, or purity differed from the industry standard, or the standard
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adulterated or misbranded, the Secretary of Agriculture had the
authority to recommend the prosecution of the offending manufacturer.2
A major limitation of the PFA was that it did not require premarket
approval of food or drugs.2 3
In 1937, 107 people died from the consumption of a new drug called
Elixir Sulfanilamide. 24 These deaths highlighted the deficiency of the
PFA because if the government had subjected Elixir Sulfanilamide to
premarket testing, it is probable that the government would have
detected a toxic substance found in the drug, diethelene glycol, otherwise
known as antifreeze. 2 As a result of this tragedy, the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act 2 of 1938 (FDCA) repealed the 1906 Pure Food
Act.27 Not surprisingly, the FDCA mandates that any new drug obtain
on its own packaging, the drug would also be considered adulterated. Id. A drug was
misbranded if it was an imitation, had a false name, used substitute packaging, or did not
list on the packaging the quantity of any alcohol or narcotics contained in the drug. Id. §§
9-10 (repealed 1938). Food was adulterated under the Act if it contained substitutes,
injurious mixtures, had any valuable part of the product abstracted in part or in full, was
processed or packaged in such a way as to hide any defects, contained any poisonous
products, or was composed of "filthy, decomposed, or putrid animal or vegetable
substance[s]." Id. § 8 (repealed 1938). Under the Act, food was misbranded if it was an
imitation product but not listed as such on its labeling or packaging, or if it had false or
misleading labeling or packaging in that the labeling or packaging did not contain accurate
weight, measure, or ingredient information. Id. § 10 (repealed 1938).
22. 21 U.S.C. §§ 11-12 (1934) (repealed 1938).
23. See Swann, supra note 19, at 249-51; see also Mark A. Kassel, From a History of
Near Misses: The Future of Dietary Supplement Regulation, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 237,
251 (1994).
24. Swann, supra note 19, at 251; see also James D. Lewis & Brian L. Strom,
Balancing Safety of Dietary Supplements with the Free Market, 136 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 616, 616 (2002).
25. Lewis & Strom, supra note 24; Swann, supra note 19, at 251.
26. 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-399 (West 2000 & Supp. 2003).
27. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), Pub. L. No. 75-717, ch. 675, §
902(a), 52 Stat. 1040, 1059 (1938).
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premarket approval.28 The burden to prove the safety of the new drug is
on the manufacturer who has to apply to the FDA for market approval.2 9
The FDCA also refined the definitions of "food" and "drug. ' 3 ° The
roots of the dietary supplement quandary began here because, according
to chapter IV of the FDCA, a food would be deemed misbranded if it
claimed to have special dietary uses, "unless its label bears such
information concerning its vitamin, mineral, and other dietary properties
as the Secretary determines to be, and by regulations prescribes as,
necessary in order fully to inform purchasers as to its value for such
uses." 31 This designation of dietary supplements as a subcategory of food
meant that dietary supplements were not subject to premarket approval.
28. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2000). Anyone who wanted to introduce a new drug into the
market had to
submit to the Secretary as a part of the application (A) full reports of
investigations which have been made to show whether or not such drug is safe for
use . . . (B) a full list of the articles used as components of such drug; (C) a full
statement of the composition of such drug; (D) a full description of the methods
used in, and the facilities and controls used for, the manufacture, processing, and
packing of such drug; (E) such samples of such drug and of the articles used as
components thereof as the Secretary may require; and (F) specimens of the
labeling proposed to be used for such drug.
Id. § 355(b)(1).
29. See Swann, supra note 19, at 251. If the FDA determines that the product is not
safe, the Secretary of Agriculture must issue an order refusing to approve the application.
21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2000). An order of refusal could be based on the need for the
manufacturer to conduct more tests on the drug, or on the need for the manufacturer to
make refinements in the manufacturing or labeling process of the drug. Id.
30. 21 U.S.C. § 321(f)-(g) (2000). Section 321(f) defines a food as "(1) articles used
for food or drink for man or other animals, (2) chewing gum, and (3) articles used for
components of any such article." Id. § 321(f). Section 321 (g)(1) defines a drug as
(A) articles recognized in the official United States Pharmacopoeia, official
Homoeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States, or official National
Formulary, or any supplement to any of them; and (B) articles intended for use
in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or
other animals and (C) articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure
or any function of the body of man or other animals; and (D) articles intended
for use as a component of any article specified in clause (A), (B), or (C).
Id. § 321(g)(1).
31. Id. § 3430). In addition to the expansion of the definitions of "food" and "drug,"
and requiring premarket approval of drugs, the FDCA allows the FDA, through the
Secretary of Agriculture, to set reasonable standards for identity, quality, and labeling
claims of food products. Id. § 343(f)-(h). In order to enforce these changes, the FDCA
increases the power of the FDA by enabling it to obtain injunctions against manufacturers
violating the Act. Id. § 332. The ability to obtain an injunction operates in addition to the
powers of seizure and criminal prosecution, two regulatory devices retained from the 1906
PFA. Compare 21 U.S.C. §§ 11-12 (1934) (repealed 1938) (authorizing criminal
prosecution), and id. § 14 (repealed 1938) (authorizing seizure), with 21 U.S.C. § 333
(2000) (authorizing criminal prosecution), and id. § 334 (authorizing seizure).
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In 1941, three years after the passage of the FDCA, the FDA
promulgated regulations for dietary supplements based on the statutory
authority provided under section 4030) of the Act.32 The regulations
were for foods that purported to be for "special dietary use" because of
the vitamin or mineral content of the food.33  These regulations
recognized five vitamins and four minerals as dietary supplements and
established minimum daily requirements for each.3 4 Under the rule, food
product labels were required to list the percentage of minimum daily
requirements for the specified vitamin or mineral, and if the product
contained a vitamin or mineral not recognized by the rule, then the label
must contain a disclaimer noting that the need for the listed vitamin or
mineral had not been determined.35
In 1958, Congress passed the Food Additives Amendment of 195836
(FAA) in order to regulate the substances which legally could be added
to food.37  In an analogous situation to the underregulation of dietary
supplements existing today, the FAA was a solution designed to close a
loophole in existing regulatory law that allowed substances defined as
"food additives" to be added to food without premarket approval.38 The
Government believed that food additives were underregulated because
the FDCA allowed unscrupulous food processors to endanger the health
of unsuspecting consumers by using untested substances as additives for
32. 21 C.F.R. § 125 (1941).
33. Id. § 125.3-.4
34. Id. (establishing labeling standards and minimum daily requirements for five
vitamins: Vitamin A, Vitamin B (thiamine), Vitamin C (ascorbic acid), Vitamin D, and
Riboflavin (vitamin B2, vitamin G)); id. § 125.4 (establishing labeling standards and
minimum daily requirements for four minerals: calcium, phosphorus, iron, and iodine).
35. Id. §§ 125.3(2), 125.4(2) (noting that the disclaimer would read "'[t]he need for
__ in human nutrition has not been established,' the blank to be filled in with the
name of such vitamin [or mineral]").
36. Pub. L. No. 85-929, 72 Stat. 1784 (1958) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 321,
331, 342, 346, 348 (2000)).
37. Id. The Food Additives Amendment of 1958 (FAA) defined a food additive as
any substance the intended use of which results or may reasonably be expected
to result, directly or indirectly, in its becoming a component or otherwise
affecting the characteristics of any food (including any substance intended for
use in producing, manufacturing, packing, processing, preparing, treating,
packaging, transporting, or holding food; and including any source of radiation
intended for any such use), if such substance is not generally recognized, among
experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate its safety, as
having been adequately shown through scientific procedures (or, in the case as a
substance used in food prior to January 1, 1958, through either scientific
procedures or experience based on common use in food) to be safe under the
conditions of its intended use.
21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (2000).
38. S. REP. No. 85-2422, at 1 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5300, 5300.
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as long as it took the Government to ban the substance.39 Under the
FDCA, the Government would first have to determine that there was a
problem with a particular additive, then conduct an investigation to
determine the safety of the substance, and finally move against the
processor, a course of action that could take years to complete.4° During
this drawn out process the dangerous additive remained on the market.4
In addressing this problem, the FAA initiated premarket approval for all
42food additives and assigned the burden of proof to the processor. Thusfood additives, unlike foods, are subject to premarket approval. In the
39. See id. at 2, reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5301.
40. Id. at 3-5, reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5301-03.
41. Id. at 2, reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5301.
42. Id. at 3, reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5301-02. Interested parties could show
a food additive to be safe either by scientific procedure or by past experience (an option
that applied only to food additives "in use prior to January 1, 1958"). Id. at 4-5, reprinted
in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5303. All new food additives were required to be proven safe by
scientific procedure. Id. Under the FAA, a food processor seeking market approval for
additives must file a petition with the FDA. See 21 U.S.C. § 348(b)(1) (2000). The FAA
requires the petition to contain
(A) the name and all pertinent information concerning such food additive,
including, where available, its chemical identity and composition;
(B) a statement of the conditions of the proposed use of such additive,
including all directions, recommendations, and suggestions proposed for the use
of such additive, and including specimens of its proposed labeling;
(C) all relevant data bearing on the physical or other technical effect such
additive is intended to produce, and the quantity of such additive required to
produce such effect;
(D) a description of practicable methods for determining the quantity of such
additive in or on food, and any substance formed in or on food, because of its
use; and
(E) full reports of investigations made with respect to the safety for use of
such additive, including full information as to the methods and controls used in
conducting such investigations.
Id. Within ninety days of receipt of the petition, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services must make a ruling on the petition. Id. § 348(c)(2). The standard of safety the
food processor must establish is one of reasonable certainty. S. REP. No. 85-2422, at 6,
reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5305. Congress thought it was creating a new standard
of safety and in an effort to achieve this standard, it included relevant factors the Secretary
should consider:
(A) the probable consumption of the additive and of any substance formed
in or on food because of the use of the additive;
(B) the cumulative effect of such additive in the diet of man or animals,
taking into account any chemically or pharmacologically related substance or
substances in such diet; and
(C) safety factors which in the opinion of experts qualified by scientific
training and experience to evaluate the safety of food additives are generally
recognized as appropriate for the use of animal experimentation data.
21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(5) (2000). If the FDA finds this burden is met, it will grant the petition;
however, the Secretary could qualify the approval by promulgating regulations as to
specific conditions of use and tolerance levels for the new food additive. Id. § 348(c).
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late 1970s, after failing to replace the 1941 regulations for dietary
supplements for nearly two decades, the FDA began to regulate dietary
supplements by labeling them as food additives.
Citing concerns that the 1941 regulations governing dietary
supplements were dated, as well as a need to address general consumer
confusion concerning the nutritional value and effectiveness of dietary
supplements, the FDA attempted to promulgate new dietary supplement
regulations in 1962.44 The FDA was concerned because there were a
multitude of dietary supplements on the market that advertised various
vitamins and minerals for which no health need was established 5 The
proposed rule, published in the Federal Register on June 20, 1962, would
have set strict labeling requirements allowing the label to bear "only
those nutrients recognized by competent authorities as essential and of
significant dietary-supplement value in human nutrition., 46 This would
have excluded from dietary supplement labels such nutrients as Vitamins
E and K, because "there [was] no convincing evidence that the ordinary
diet requires supplementation with these nutrients."47 In addition, the
proposed rule would have set minimum and maximum potency levels,
referred to as the "recommended daily intake," for the vitamins and
minerals that were allowed to be on the labels.48
The proposed potency range and exclusion of certain nutrients from
labels caused a groundswell of opposition as the public argued that the
labeling requirements were too restrictive on dietary supplements. 9
Members of the public viewed dietary supplements as an efficient way to
supplement their diet and increase their health and saw the proposed
43. S. REP. No. 103-410, at 15 (1994); see also infra notes 73-78 and accompanying
text (regulating dietary supplements as food additives under the FAA would have
required dietary supplement manufacturers to obtain premarket approval).
44. See Notice of Proposal To Revise Regulations, 27 Fed. Reg. 5815, 5815 (proposed
June 20, 1962) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 1, 125) (stating that major changes in the
1941 regulations were necessary in order to account for the "many advances in the science
of nutrition and its commercial applications to products that are represented or which
purport to be foods for special dietary uses").
45. See Nat'l Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. FDA, 504 F.2d 761, 767-69 (2d Cir. 1974)
(discussing the motivation of the FDA in promulgating the 1962 regulations).
46. Notice of Proposal to Revise Regulations, 27 Fed. Reg. at 5817.
47. Id. Other nutrients deemed essential but not significant to the ordinary diet that
would have been excluded from dietary supplement labels were folic acid, pantothenic
acid, linoleic acid, copper, magnesium, manganese, zinc, sodium, and potassium. Id.
48. Id. at 5816-17. The potency range for a nutrient was an amount close to the
"daily requirements" for each substance. For example, because the recognized daily
requirement for the mineral calcium was listed as 750 milligrams for an adult, a dietary
supplement containing calcium could have a potency level within the range of the
"recommended daily intake" of 400-1500 milligrams. id.
49. See Colloton, supra note 14.
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FDA regulations as an unnecessary hindrance on their ability to access
dietary supplements. 5" As a result of the number of comments received,
the FDA did not issue a final version of the rule until June 18, 1966,
nearly four years after the initial proposal."' The final version of the rule
kept many of the controversial aspects of the earlier rule, including the
minimum and maximum potency levels. 2 In an effort to dispel consumer
confusion, the rule would also have required a prominent disclaimer on
the label of each dietary supplement attesting that a proper level of
vitamins and minerals can be achieved through food.53
Once again, the public expressed dissatisfaction with the rule by
inundating the FDA with comments. 4 As a result, on December 14,
1966, the day before the proposed rule was to go into effect, the FDA
stayed the effective date of the regulation in order to hold public
50. See Nat'l Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Kennedy, 572 F.2d 377, 379 (2d Cir. 1978).
The court stated:
[T]he battle reflects what appears to be a sincere sentiment on the part of many
citizens that daily ingestion of a substantial quantity and variety of vitamins and
minerals in the form of pills or liquids, in addition to those furnished by ordinary
diet, is needed for good health, especially because of the increasing consumption
of "the modern food fads-sweet drinks, junk foods, heavy sugar diets" and
"wheat germ-free bread and nutritionally inadequate breakfast foods," and the
FDA's equally sincere belief that the promotion of what, on a previous review,
this court called a "dazzling array" of recommended daily dosages and
combinations, is causing consumers to waste millions of dollars annually in the
purchase of vitamin and mineral preparations which they either do not need at
all or do not need in the potencies or combinations that are being bought.
Id. (citations omitted).
51. See Dietary Foods, 31 Fed. Reg. 8521, 8521 (proposed June 18, 1966) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 125). The rule stated that
[t]he numerous comments received in response to a notice of proposed rule
making in the above-identified matter published on the initiative of the
Commissioner of Food and Drugs in the FEDERAL REGISTER of June 20, 1962
(27 F.R. 5815), have been evaluated, in addition to other pertinent information,
and it is concluded that the regulations for food for special dietary uses should be
revised.
Id.; see also Kassel, supra note 23, at 255.
52. Dietary Foods, 31 Fed. Reg. at 8525. The final minimum and maximum potency
levels were slightly lower than the original proposed rule. Compare id., with Notice of
Proposal To Revise Regulations, 27 Fed. Reg. at 5817. The proposed rule also explained
that the "recommended daily intake," now called the "recommended dietary allowance"
(RDA), was created by the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council and
that RDAs "represent daily nutrient intakes judged to be adequate for maintenance of
good nutrition in the population of the United States and are for the planning of food
supplies and guides for interpretation of food consumption records of groups of people."
Dietary Foods, 31 Fed. Reg. at 8522.
53. Dietary Foods, 31 Fed. Reg. at 8525.
54. See Kassel, supra note 23, at 255-56.
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 54:661
hearings." A new rule was not proposed until January 19, 1973.56 This
version of the rule proposed that vitamin and mineral products
containing more than the maximum potency level of the RDA would be
classified as a drug.57 On August 2, 1973, the FDA published a final
version of the rule which was to take effect on January 1, 1975.
8
In response to the rule, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals received
fifteen petitions for review.5 9 In National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v.
FDA, 60 the Second Circuit found that evidence of the need for new
standards was impressive because of the number of nutritionally
irrational dietary supplements and the general confusion of consumers
due to the lack of definitions and standards for dietary supplements."
55. Order Staying the Effective Date of Regulations; Amending Regulations; and
Allowing Additional Time for Filing Objections, 31 Fed. Reg. 15,730, 15,730 (Dec. 14,
1966). The hearings began on May 21, 1968, "lasted for more than 22 months and
developed a transcript of 32,405 pages, together with hundreds of exhibits and other
record materials." Nat'l Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. FDA, 504 F.2d 761,768 (2d Cir. 1974).
56. Definition, Identity, and Label Statements; Proposed Findings of Fact,
Conclusions, and Tentative Order Following a Public Hearing, 38 Fed. Reg. 2152, 2152
(Jan. 19, 1973). The 1973 rule was promulgated after the FDA reviewed the transcript of
the hearings and numerous public comments. Nat'l Nutritional Foods, 504 F.2d at 768.
57. Label Statements Concerning Dietary Properties of Food Purporting To Be or
Represented for Special Dietary Uses, 38 Fed. Reg. 2149, 2149 (proposed Jan. 19, 1973)
(to be codified at pts. 1, 3, 125). The text of the law reads: "Any product containing more
than the upper limit of the U.S. RDA of a vitamin or mineral is a drug, except for a food
represented for use solely under medical supervision in the dietary management of specific
diseases and disorders." Id. The FDA responded to criticism of this position by stating
that the FDA reviewed the records and findings of fact and concluded that there was no
evidence that dietary supplements exceeding the RDA were nutritionally useful. Label
Statements; Findings of Fact, Conclusions, and Final Order, 38 Fed. Reg. 20,708, 20,710
(Aug. 2, 1973). The FDA stated that dietary supplements "contain[ing] vitamins or
minerals in excess of the upper limits of the U.S. RDA's are in fact articles intended for
use in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man and therefore.,
pursuant to the definition contained in 21 U.S.C. 321(g)(1)(B), are properly classified as
drugs." Id. On August 2, 1973, the same day as the final labeling rule was published for
dietary supplements, the FDA published a rule which classified high potency Vitamin A
and D dietary supplements as drugs. See Status of Vitamin A and Vitamin D, 38 Fed.
Reg. 20,723, 20,725 (proposed Aug. 2, 1973) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 3). These
regulations were struck down by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. See Nat'l
Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Mathews, 557 F.2d 325, 338 (2d Cir. 1977); Kassel, supra note
23, at 257.
58. Label Statements; Findings of Fact, Conclusions, and Final Order, 38 Fed. Reg. at
20,718. The proposed rule noted that the FDA had received 790 objections to the rule and
that other government offices forwarded an additional 20,000 objection letters to the
agency, but that the objections offered no substantive reasons for altering the rule. Id. at
20,708.
59. Nat'l Nutritional Foods, 504 F.2d at 767.
60. 504 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1974).
61. Id. at 775-76, 778. Nutritionally irrational dietary supplements contain
"quantitative levels and qualitative combinations of nutrients for which no human
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Nonetheless, the Second Circuit remanded the rule to the FDA for
further consideration of three main issues.62 First, the court wanted the
FDA to consider whether the RDA potency limits had room for upward
flexibility.63 Second, the court found that the exclusion of essential
vitamins and minerals solely because the FDA had yet to assign RDAs to
them was unreasonable, considering that the process of creating the rule
had been going on for twelve years. 64  Finally, the Second Circuit
invalidated the provision of the proposed rule that would have allowed
the FDA to label vitamins and minerals exceeding the RDA as drugs. 5
Before the FDA could issue new regulations, Congress passed the
6Proxmire Amendment on April 22, 1976. The Proxmire Amendment
was a direct response to the proposed regulations that the FDA had been
67
attempting to implement. The Proxmire Amendment limited the
FDA's regulatory abilities by prohibiting the FDA from (1) establishing
maximum potency limits for vitamins or minerals; (2) classifying certain
vitamins and minerals as drugs solely because they exceeded the potency
individual need could possibly exist." Id. at 776. The court also cited evidence that
"[a]lthough approximately 20 percent of the users of dietary supplements of vitamins and
minerals actually use those articles to supplement or balance their diet, more than 40
percent of those persons admit they have no idea which vitamins or minerals, if any, are not
sufficiently supplied by their diet." Id. (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 785-89.
63. Id. at 785. The FDA's argument for limiting the potency of the vitamin or
mineral to the RDA was that studies did not show that vitamins or minerals exceeding the
level of RDA served any nutritional value. See Label Statements; Findings of Fact,
Conclusions, and Final Order, 38 Fed. Reg. at 20,710. In holding that the RDAs had room
for upward flexibility, the court found that "vast multitudes of consumers and significant
numbers of nutritionists reject, e.g., the FDA's view that 500 mg. per day of vitamin C is
without nutritional value." Nat'l Nutritional Foods, 504 F.2d at 784. At the time, the
FDA's proposed RDA for Vitamin C for adults was sixty milligrams. Label Statements;
Findings of Fact, Conclusions, and Final Order, 38 Fed. Reg. at 20,713-14.
64. Nat'! Nutritional Foods, 504 F.2d at 786-87.
65. Id. at 789. The FDA justified regulating dietary supplements that exceeded the
RDA as drugs because "'[t]he hearing record discloses no known food or nutrition use of
nutrients at such high levels."' Id. (quoting Label Statements; Findings of Fact,
Conclusions and Final Order, 38 Fed. Reg. at 20,710). The court found this justification
was a "mischaracterization of the record" because certain people, such as women who
take oral contraceptives, have needs for vitamins and minerals in potencies above the
upper limits and because "many common foods contain potencies per serving considerably
above the upper limits . . . for example ... six ounces of fried beef liver contains 18 times
the upper limit of vitamin A and ... a glass of orange juice contains 140% the upper limit
of vitamin C." Id. & n.34.
66. Health Research and Health Service Amendments of 1976 (HRHSA), Pub. L.
No. 94-278, § 501(a), 90 Stat. 401, 410 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 305 (2000)).
67. Margaret Gilhooley, Herbal Remedies and Dietary Supplements: The Boundaries
of Drug Claims and Freedom of Choice, 49 FLA. L. REV. 663, 675 (1997); Jennifer J.
Spokes, Confusion in Dietary Supplement Regulation: The Sports Products Irony, 77 B.U.
L. REV. 181,189 (1997).
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level that the FDA had determined was nutritionally rational or useful;
and (3) limiting the ingredient composition of vitamins, minerals, or
other ingredients contained in dietary supplements.68 On October 19,
1976, the FDA attempted to comply with the court order and the
Proxmire Amendment's limitations by issuing a revision of the 1973
regulation.69 In National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Kennedy,0 the
Second Circuit once again remanded the FDA's proposed rule because it
found that the required public notice and comment on the regulation
reflecting the changes in the FDA's regulatory power under the
Proxmire Amendment was absent.7' The FDA then revoked the dietary
supplement regulations in 1979.72 After nearly two decades of attempting
to regulate dietary supplements through the rulemaking process, the
FDA had nothing to show for all of its effort.
68. 21 U.S.C. § 350(a)(1) (2000). There were a few minor alterations to the rule, such
as the removal of the proposed disclaimer stating that most dietary needs are satisfied
through the food people eat.
69. Label Statements Concerning Dietary Properties of Food Purporting To Be or
Represented for Special Dietary Uses, 41 Fed. Reg. 46,156, 46,156 (Oct. 19, 1976).
70. 572 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1978).
71. Id. at 383. See generally Vitamin and Mineral Drug Products for Over-the-
Counter Human Use; Withdrawal of Proposed Monograph, 46 Fed. Reg. 57,914, 57,914-15
(Nov. 27, 1981) (providing the history of the FDA's attempt to promulgate a rule
governing dietary supplements). In reaching its decision, the Second Circuit
acknowledged that the rulemaking process had devolved into a bitter battle and expressed
regret in again remanding the rule back to the FDA. See Kennedy, 572 F.2d at 379.
72. Vitamin and Mineral Products; Revocation of Regulations, 44 Fed. Reg. 16,005,
16,005 (Mar. 16, 1979). The revocation of the dietary supplement rule appeared in the
same issue of the Federal Register as a panel report and proposed regulations on OTC
vitamin and mineral products. Vitamin and Mineral Drug Products for Over-the-Counter
Human Use; Withdrawal of Proposed Monograph, 46 Fed. Reg. at 57,914-15 (explaining
the coincidence of the two reports being published on the same day). The panel was
created as an independent review agency to review the safety, regulation, and labeling
claims of drugs containing vitamins and minerals. Id. at 57,914. The proposed rule was
based on the panel's report and would have regulated OTC vitamin and mineral products
as drugs. Id. at 57,914-15. In an unsuccessful attempt to avoid confusion, the rule
attempted to distinguish OTC dietary supplements from other dietary supplements, which
are regulated as foods. Id. The unfortunate coincidence of concurrent publication of the
two rules, taken with the uncertainty surrounding the Proxmire Amendment, led to a
great deal of confusion and widespread dissatisfaction by the public and members of
Congress, which ultimately led the FDA to withdraw the OTC rule in 1981. Id. When the
FDA withdrew the OTC rule, it acknowledged the general confusion and dissatisfaction
surrounding its regulation of dietary supplements. Id. The FDA explained that by
withdrawing the OTC rule, "the agency formally recognize[d] and respond[ed] to the
growing public sentiment expressed by the thousands of comments received from the
public and by recent congressional interest in vitamin and mineral regulation. It [was]
indicative also of an ongoing agency reassessment of all aspects of vitamin and mineral
regulation." Id.
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Having failed to regulate the industry through the rulemaking process,
the FDA attempted to regulate dietary supplements on a case-by-case
basis by going after manufacturers through the court system.73  The
FDA's strategy was to classify vitamins and minerals as "food
additives., 74 Under the Food Additives Amendment of the FDCA in
1958, food additives required premarket approval from the FDA before
they could be marketed or sold.75  In United States v. Two Plastic
Drums,8 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit emphatically
rejected this strategy.7   The Seventh Circuit held that "[tihe only
justification for this Alice-in-Wonderland approach is to allow the FDA
to make an end-run around the statutory scheme and shift to the
processors the burden of proving the safety of a substance in all
circumstances., 78  This decision seemingly foreclosed the attempt to
regulate dietary supplements as food additives.79
73. Kassel, supra note 23, at 259-60 (explaining that the FDA used a two-prong attack
against dietary supplement manufacturers comprised of a limited number of enforcement
adjudications coupled with a large number of regulatory letters).
74. Stephen H. McNamara, Dietary Supplements of Botanicals and Other Substances:
A New Era of Regulation, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 341, 343 (1995) (noting that the FDA
had used this strategy against popular dietary supplements such as magnesium orotate,
black currant oil, and St. John's wort). In United States v. Two Plastic Drums, 984 F.2d 814
(7th Cir. 1993), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals summarized the FDA's argument
behind classifying dietary supplements as food additives: "The FDA argues that the
statutory language of [21 U.S.C. § 321(s)] clearly indicates that any and every component
of an article of food is a food additive," id. at 817.
75. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text (discussing the FAA's requirement
of premarket approval for food additives and the placement of the burden of proof on the
producer, not the government).
76. 984 F.2d 814 (7th Cir. 1993).
77. See id. at 819-20. The dispute in this case centered on the FDA's seizure of two
drums of black currant oil (derived from the seeds of black currant berries). Id. at 815.
The FDA seized the barrels and attempted to destroy them as an adulterated food
additive. Id. at 815-16. The FDA acknowledged that had the black currant oil been
produced for individual consumption, as by teaspoon, it would not be a food additive. Id.
at 816. However, because the black current oil was produced in a capsule made from
gelatin and glycerin, the FDA argued it was a food consisting of three additives. Id. The
court rejected this logic, holding that the FDA's interpretation of food additive was so
broad that it would eliminate any distinction between a food and a food additive. Id. at
819; see also United States v. 29 Cartons of * * * an Article of Food, 987 F.2d 33, 37 (1st
Cir. 1993). In the legislative history of the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act
(DSHEA), the Senate cited these two cases as examples to show that the "FDA has been
distorting the law in its actions to try to prevent the marketing of safe dietary supplement
substances." S. REP. No. 103-410, at 16 (1994).
78. Two Plastic Drums, 984 F.2d at 819.
79. See id. at 819-20. In DSHEA, Congress later would state explicitly that dietary
supplements are not food additives. 21 U.S.C. § 321(s)(6) (2000). In the legislative history
for DSHEA, the Senate noted that, although the court decisions in Two Plastic Drums and
29 Cartons should have made it clear that dietary supplements are not food additives,
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In 1990, Congress passed the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act
(NLEA) as an amendment to the FDCA. 80 The NLEA set standards for
health claims for all foods and instructed the FDA to create similar
standards for dietary supplements.81 One year later, the FDA responded
by proposing to subject dietary supplements to the same labeling
regulations as food.82 Although the FDA acknowledged that imposing
the food labeling regulations on dietary supplements was contrary to the
intentions of some members of Congress, the FDA expressed its belief
that absent clear congressional direction, dietary supplement labeling
claims should meet at least the same standard as food. 3
Congress disagreed and responded by passing the Dietary Supplement
Act (DSA) of 1992.84 The purpose of the DSA was to mandate a one-
year moratorium on the FDA to prevent it from implementing
Congress found it necessary to state this holding explicitly in DSHEA out of fear that the
FDA would challenge the court decisions. See S. REP. No. 103-410, at 16-17.
80. Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 (1990) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 321,343, 343-1,
371 (2000)).
81. 21 U.S.C. § 343(r) (2000). From 1986 to 1990, the FDA issued proposed
regulations that would have allowed food manufacturers to make health claims concerning
the product on the product label. S. REP. No. 103-410, at 15. Congress believed that the
regulations were too tough on dietary supplements because "[tihe level of proof required
for dietary supplement claims was unrealistic in that the degree of scientific consensus and
clinical data required eliminated almost all existing supplement claims." Id. As a result,
Congress enacted the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (NLEA), which set standards
for health claims for food and "specifically said that the FDA could recommend a
different standard and approval procedure for supplements." Id. The implication was
that Congress wanted the FDA to create more lenient standards for dietary supplements.
See id. at 14-15. The NLEA also specifically instructed the FDA to investigate the validity
of health claims of ten dietary supplements and their impact on certain diseases, and to
review health claims for "[c]alcium and osteoporosis, dietary fiber and cancer, lipids and
cardiovascular disease, lipids and cancer, sodium and hypertension, and dietary fiber and
cardiovascular disease . . . folic acid and neural tube defects, [antioxidant] vitamins and
cancer, zinc and immune function in the elderly, and omega-3 fatty acids and heart
disease." § 3(b)(1)(A)(vi), 104 Stat. at 2361. When the FDA responded to the NLEA in
December 1991, the only health claim it approved was that of calcium and osteoporosis. S.
REP. No. 103-410, at 15. In 1994, in the legislative history for DSHEA, Congress noted
that "[o]nly one other claim has been approved since that time, the claim for folic acid and
neural tube defects, and that claim was only approved after intense public pressure." Id.
at 15-16.
82. Labeling; General Requirements for Health Claims for Food, 56 Fed. Reg.
60,537, 60,537 (proposed Nov. 27, 1991) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 20, 101).
83. Id. at 60,539-40. The FDA was concerned that a less stringent regulatory scheme
for dietary supplements would lead to consumer confusion because dietary supplements
would contain health claims that foods consisting of the same substance as the dietary
supplement could not. Id. at 60,540.
84. Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491 (1992); 138 CONG. REC. H12,597 (daily ed.
Oct. 8, 1992) (statement of Rep. Waxman).
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regulations for dietary supplement health claims under the NLEA.8 5 The
moratorium was intended to allow time for Congress, the Department of
Health and Human Services, and industry groups to develop rules solely
for dietary supplements. 6 In reality, Congress used the moratorium to
prevent the FDA from implementing regulations that Congress felt were
too strict on the health claims of dietary supplements.r Congress
believed that, by requiring dietary supplements to meet the same
standards as food, the FDA was attempting to limit the amount of
pertinent nutritional information that the dietary supplement could
contain and thereby restrict consumer access to these supplements.8
The DSA required the FDA to issue new health claim regulations for
dietary supplements by June 1993.89 On June 18, 1993, the FDA issued
an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR), which included an
in-depth review of the FDA's stance on dietary supplements, including
reasons for apprehension about the proliferation of dietary supplements
available on the marketi" The FDA reiterated its beliefs that dietary
85. 138 CONG. REC. H12,597 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992) (statement of Rep. Waxman).
The theory behind the moratorium was that, because the NLEA primarily dealt with food,
it was proper for Congress to prevent the FDA from using the NLEA as a basis for
making rules for dietary supplements. Id. (stating that "[b]ecause of the differences in the
history of use and function of dietary supplements and conventional foods, it is
appropriate for Congress to enact this moratorium so that the issue of how best to regulate
dietary supplements may be carefully considered").
86. Id.
87. See 139 CONG. REC. S16,868 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy). Senators Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) and Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) proposed the
Dietary Supplement Regulation Moratorium Act of 1993 in an effort to add four months
to the Dietary Supplement Act of 1992, which set a one year moratorium that would
expire on December 31, 1993. Id. Senator Kennedy stated that Senator Hatch had
introduced DSHEA in April, and Senator Kennedy believed that additional time would
result in its passage. Id. The Senate unanimously passed the bill, but the House did not
act on the legislation. S. REP. No. 103-410, at 16 (1994).
88. See Colloton, supra note 14, at 522.
89. 138 CONG. REC. H12,597 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992) (statement of Rep. Waxman)
(stating that "this legislation creates a moratorium in the implementation of the NLEA
with respect to dietary supplements. This legislation also requires the Secretary to
repropose NLEA regulations applicable to dietary supplements no later than June 15,
1993").
90. Regulation of Dietary Supplements, 58 Fed. Reg. 33,690, 33,690, 33,692
(proposed June 18, 1993). As cause for apprehension of dietary supplements, the FDA
cited two health tragedies:
In 1989, at least 1,500 cases of eosinophilia myalgia syndrome (EMS), including
38 deaths, were associated with the use of L-trytophan-containing dietary
supplements. Within the last year, there also have been a number of reports of
serious illnesses associated with certain herbal and other botanical supplements.
These developments have raised significant public health concerns.
Id. at 33,690. The FDA also cited uncertainty surrounding herbs and other botanicals
because of the lack of data for these products. Id. at 33,697.
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supplements could be regulated as a "food" or "drug" depending upon
the use of the product, and that a dietary supplement "intended for use
in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease, or
to affect the structure or a function of the body" should be regulated as a
drug.9' Congress interpreted the ANPR to mean that the FDA would
continue to attempt to overregulate dietary supplements and that
therefore, Congress would need to intervene in order to provide the
public with access to dietary supplements. 9' As a result, Congress
unanimously passed the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act
(DSHEA) of 199413 which declared the FDA's ANPR to be null and
void.94
B. The Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994
The underlying premise of DSHEA is that dietary supplements are
safe and the FDA should allow the public wider access to them.95
91. Id. at 33,692. The FDA also contended that the "intended use of a product may
be determined from labeling, advertising, or other sources." Id.
92. S. REP. No. 103-410, at 16-17 (stating that there is a "need for congressional
action to assure citizens have continued access to dietary supplements and information
about their benefits"). Part of this need was predicated on the belief that "[i]nstead of
using this additional time [provided by the one-year moratorium] to rethink this heavy-
handed approach to protecting consumers against misleading claims and other
controversial issues, the agency simply reissued the original regulations." 139 CONG. REC.
S16,868 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993) (statement of Sen. Kassebaum).
93. Pub. L. No. 103-417, 108 Stat. 4325 (1994).
94. Id. § 11, at 4332. Political support for DSHEA was so strong that, in addition to
unanimous passage by both houses of Congress, the majority of the House of
Representatives and two-thirds of the Senate co-sponsored the bill. Dangers of Dietary
Supplements Hearing, supra note 14 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch, Chairman, Judiciary
Comm.).
95. § 2, 21 U.S.C. § 321 note (2000) (noting that safety problems with dietary
supplements are relatively rare, that nearly fifty percent of the population takes some
form of dietary supplement, and that use of dietary supplements has the potential to
decrease the growing cost of health care (then listed at over a billion dollars, roughly
twelve percent of the GNP)); 140 CONG. REC. S11,711 (daily ed. Aug. 13, 1994)
(statement of Sen. Hatch) (arguing that Congress needed to enact DSHEA because the
FDA had been repressing the dietary supplement industry). Senator Hatch exhibited
obvious animosity toward the FDA when he stated:
Let us remember why this legislation is necessary.
It is not one Senator versus another, nor Democrat versus Republican, nor
the Senate versus the House.
It is the U.S. Congress versus the Food and Drug Administration.
It is the majority of the U.S. Senate versus the continual harassment by one
tiny agency which has constantly misled the American public through
deliberately false and misleading statements.
It is the 250 Members of the House of Representatives against mindless
Government bureaucracy, against continual overregulation, against an agency
whose guiding principle has always been: One way-their way.
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DSHEA explicitly states that the dietary supplement industry is an
integral part of the U.S. economy and that the Government should not
impose unreasonable regulatory barriers on the industry. In order to
reach these goals, DSHEA broadened the definition of dietary
supplements to include herbs and other botanicals, amino acids, and any
other "dietary substance for use by man to supplement the diet by
increasing the total dietary intake; or ...a concentrate, metabolite,
constituent, extract, or combination of any [of the named]
ingredient[s]." 9' By including a wide range of substances in the definition
of a dietary supplement, DSHEA greatly increased the amount of
substances that could be marketed as dietary supplements and sold to the
public.
9 8
In addition to broadening the definition of a dietary supplement,
DSHEA put an end to the debate on whether a dietary supplement
should be regulated as a food or drug by stating: "[A] dietary supplement
shall be deemed to be a food within the meaning of [the act]." 99 As a
food, dietary supplements are not subject to premarket approval.
DSHEA also foreclosed the "food additive" argument by excluding from
the definition of food additives "an ingredient described in paragraph (ff)
[the definition of dietary supplement] in, or intended for use in, a dietary
supplement."' ° Finally, DSHEA placed the burden of proving the safety
of dietary supplements on the FDA by stating that "the United States
shall bear the burden of proof on each element to show that a dietary
supplement is adulterated."' 0' DSHEA thus removed all doubt regarding
the regulation of dietary supplements and firmly established that they
were not to be treated as drugs or food additives.'O'
Id.
96. § 2(12)(A)-(C), 21 U.S.C. § 321 note (noting that the dietary supplement industry
is an important part of the U.S. economy because "the industry consistently projects a
positive trade balance; and ... the estimated 600 dietary supplement manufacturers in the
United States produce approximately 4,000 products, with total annual sales of such
products alone reaching at least $4,000,000,000").
97. Id. § 321(ff)(1)(E)-(F).
98. See id. § 321(ff).
99. Id.
100. Id. § 321(s).
101. Id. § 342(f).
102. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text. In the legislative history, Senator
Hatch stated:
The purpose of this legislation, as enunciated in section 2, is also to clarify
that dietary supplements are not drugs or food additives, that dietary
supplements should not be regulated as drugs, and that burden of proof is on the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to prove that a product is unsafe before it
can be removed from the marketplace.
S. REP. No. 103-410, at 2 (1994).
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However, DSHEA did not remove all FDA authority to regulate
dietary supplements. 3 Under DSHEA, a dietary supplement may be
deemed adulterated if the supplement "presents a significant or
unreasonable risk of illness or injury under (i) conditions of use
recommended or suggested in labeling, or (ii) if no conditions of use are
suggested or recommended in the labeling, under ordinary conditions of
use;" or if the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services declares the supplement "to pose an imminent hazard to public
health or safety."' °4 A potential third avenue of regulation for the FDA
is the ability to create mandatory "good manufacturing practice[s]" for
the dietary supplement industry through the rulemaking process.105
Good manufacturing practices are minimum procedures that
manufacturers of dietary supplements would have to meet when
manufacturing, packaging, or holding dietary supplements to prevent
adulteration of the product."6
On March 13, 2003, nearly ten years after Congress enacted DSHEA,
the FDA published a proposed rule establishing current good
manufacturing practices (CGMP). ' °7 If adopted by the FDA, the CGMP
103. 21 U.S.C. § 342(f)(1)(A)-(C) (2000). Contra supra note 14 (explaining that there
is debate as to whether DSHEA decreased or increased the regulatory power of the
FDA).
104. 21 U.S.C. § 342(f)(1) (2000).
105. Id. § 342(g).
106. Current Good Manufacturing Practice in Manufacturing, Packing, or Holding
Dietary Ingredients and Dietary Supplements, 68 Fed. Reg. 12,158, 12,158 (proposed Mar.
13, 2003).
107. Id. For many members of Congress and dietary supplement manufacturers, this
ten year delay was too long. See Dangers of Dietary Supplements Hearing, supra note 14
(statement of Sen. John McCain, Chairman, Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp.);
Ephedra-Containing Supplements Hearings, supra note 5, at 259-60 (statement of Rep.
Frank Pallone, Jr., Member, Comm. on Energy & Commerce). Although it did take the
FDA ten years to propose the current good manufacturing practices (CGMP), the FDA
was meticulous in drafting the rule. See Current Good Manufacturing Practice in
Manufacturing, Packing, or Holding Dietary Ingredients and Dietary Supplements, 68
Fed. Reg. at 12,160-61 (detailing goals for the CGMP). Specifically, the FDA held several
public meetings in which it met with representatives of the dietary supplement industry,
toured a number of manufacturing plants, and reviewed data from extensive telephone
surveys in order to better understand the industry. Id. The telephone surveys revealed
that an estimated 158.1 million people annually consumed dietary supplements in the
United States at a cost of approximately $8.5 billion and found that
41 percent of the surveyed consumers who use vitamins and minerals think
they are very safe and only 50 percent think they are somewhat safe;
Only 24 percent of the surveyed consumers who use herbal products think
they are very safe; and only 53 percent think they are somewhat safe; and
Twelve percent of the surveyed consumers who have used dietary
supplements say they have experienced side effects or adverse reactions from
their use of dietary supplements.
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would create minimum specifications for purity, identity, quality,
strength, and composition of dietary supplements.'08 The CGMP would
require dietary supplement manufacturers to test their products to
ensure that preset specifications are met.'O° The manufacturer also would
need to create and retain master manufacturing records to prove that the
product has been tested and meets the specifications." If the dietary
supplement does not meet the specifications, the FDA would be able to
classify the dietary supplement as "adulterated.'. 1  Additionally, the
manufacturers would need to list the specifications on the label and
verify that the labels accurately portray the content of the dietary
supplement. If the composition of the dietary supplement differs from
what is represented on the label, the FDA may also deem the product
adulterated."3 The CGMP also would require the manufacturers to
monitor adverse event reports and submit them to the FDA upon
request.14 Finally, the CGMP would establish minimum standards for
the manufacturing plants for design, maintenance, and packing
procedures.1
5
The survey also found strong public support for increased Government
regulation of dietary supplements; 74 percent of the surveyed consumers
reported that they think that the Government should be more involved in
ensuring that these products are safe and do what they claim to do.
Id.
108. Current Good Manufacturing Practice in Manufacturing, Packing, or Holding
Dietary Ingredients and Dietary Supplements, 68 Fed. Reg. at 12,162.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 12,163.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 12,162. For example, "if the proposed rule is finalized, if the label for a folic
acid supplement declares that the dietary supplement contains a certain level of folic acid,
the folic acid supplement must actually contain that level, or we would consider the folic
acid supplement to be adulterated." Id. Although this seems like a basic concept, to have
the label accurately portray the ingredients of the product, the FDA found that there was
considerable variation from what was in the product and what was on the label. Id. at
12,162-63. The FDA tested twenty dietary supplements containing ephedra and
discovered that "[h]alf of the products tested differed in their label claims for ephedra
alkaloid content and their actual alkaloid content. In some cases, the discrepancy
exceeded 20 percent. One product did not have any ephedra alkaloids." Id. at 12,163.
(emphasis added).
113. Id. at 12,162-63.
114. Id. at 12,164-65.
115. Id. at 12,162. Minimum maintenance standards for manufacturing plants are
necessary because the FDA found unsanitary conditions during their plant inspections. Id.
(specifying that the FDA found "[p]est infestation, building and equipment defects, and
leaking pipes that drip onto dietary supplements").
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C. The FDA's Attempts to Regulate Ephedra
In 1993, the FDA began to receive adverse event reports (AERs)
concerning products containing ephedrine alkaloids.'1 6  The AERs
documented adverse events ranging from relatively minor symptoms,
such as increased blood pressure, anxiety, and insomnia, to severe
symptoms, such as strokes and heart attacks."7 In response to the AERs,
the FDA evaluated 125 different products containing ephedra. " s The
FDA discovered that the majority of ephedra products on the market
contained anywhere from six to twenty other ingredients, many of which
had the ability to boost the effects of ephedra.' 9 Based on the study of
ephedra products and the information contained in the AERs, the FDA
proposed a rule for dietary supplements containing ephedrine alkaloids
on June 4, 1997.12D
The proposed rule identified three ways in which dietary supplements
containing ephedra alkaloids would be considered adulterated: (1) if the
dietary supplement had a dosage of eight milligrams or more of any
ephedra alkaloid per serving; (2) if the product's label suggested taking
more than eight milligrams in one six-hour period or twenty-four
milligrams in one day; or (3) if the product contained a combination of
an ephedra alkaloid and another stimulant, such as caffeine." The
116. Dietary Supplements Containing Ephedrine Alkaloids, 62 Fed. Reg. 30,678,
30,679 (proposed June 4, 1997) (noting that the FDA had received over 800 adverse event
reports (AERs) concerning ephedra products since 1993). In response to the AERs the
FDA received, the Working Group, the FDA's Food Advisory Committee, held a meeting
concerning ephedra based dietary supplements. Id. at 30,679-80. The Working Group
concluded that products containing ephedrine alkaloids posed a health risk, and
recommended the FDA move to regulate them. Id. at 30,680. Over the next six months,
the FDA received double the amount of AERs. Id.
117. Id. at 30,679. The list of adverse symptoms associated with ephedra use also
included irregular heart rhythms, chest pain, hyperactivity, nervousness, psychoses, and
seizures. Id. The Federal Register further noted that "[m]any of these signs and symptoms
occurred in young adults who generally would not have been expected to be at high risk
for such conditions (e.g., heart attack and stroke) [and many adverse events were
reported to occur with the first use or within the first 2 weeks." Id.
118. Id. In evaluating the dietary supplements, the FDA found that the products
marketed were for many different purposes including "weight loss, body building,
increased energy, increased mental concentration, increased sexual sensations, or euphoria
or as alternatives to illicit street drugs." Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 30,692-96. In choosing eight milligrams, the FDA noted that doses of
twenty milligrams or higher can lead to adverse events occurring in a significant
percentage of obese persons and that adverse events, such as high blood pressure, cardiac
arrest, and death had been associated with ephedra products containing as little as ten
milligrams per serving. Id. at 30,692-93. The FDA also noted that some adverse events
occurred with servings of eight and nine milligrams of ephedra; however, limitations in the
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proposed rule also would have required prominent warnings on the label
cautioning against extended use and a health disclaimer cautioning
against exceeding the recommended amount or using the product for
longer than one week."'2 This proposed rule was unpopular with
consumers and manufacturers because of the dosage restrictions and led
121to a massive lobbying effort against the proposed rule and the FDA .
In response, Congress, through the House Committee on Science,
requested that the General Accounting Office (GAO) examine the
121FDA's process in proposing the rule. In July 1999, the GAO concluded
that additional studies were needed before the proposed rule could go
into effect.125 The GAO Report called for more information, concluding
that, although the AERs seemed to signal a health risk, they failed to
demonstrate a causal relationship between ephedra products and the
adverse events contained in the reports. 26  The GAO questioned the
validity of the AERs because in some instances, the reports did not
contain, or had inconsistent data on, the amount, length, and use of the
product.2 7 As a result, the GAO found that relying primarily on the
AERs made the proposed one week limitation on duration of use and
the maximum dosage level appear arbitrary.
28
available data did not show that a lesser serving would be safer. Id. at 30,693. As a result,
the FDA tentatively proposed the eight milligram limit and stated that the "FDA cannot
say that it is a safe level, nor has it been arrived at in a way that factored in some margin of
safety. The evidence does not exist to establish a safe level." Id. at 30,693-94. The FDA
also observed that the combination of ephedrine alkaloids with other stimulants tended to
"produce more frequent, more severe, or potentially different patterns of adverse effects
than those noted with the use of an ephedrine alkaloid alone." Id. at 30,695.
122. Id. at 30,700-02.
123. See Guy Gugliotta, Dietary Supplement Makers Flex Muscle: $15 Billion Industry
Fends Off Attempts To Regulate Ephedra over Health Risks, WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 2000,
at Al. At the head of the lobbying effort against the FDA were Senators Orrin Hatch and
Tom Harkin. Id. Buoyed by financial support from dietary supplement manufacturers
(by 2000, Senator Hatch had received more than $80,000 since 1994 and Senator Harkin
had received more than $72,000), the two senators "coordinate[d] lobbying efforts and co-
signed letters to the FDA that repeated the companies' arguments almost verbatim." Id.
124. Dietary Supplements Containing Ephedrine Alkaloids; Withdrawal in Part, 65
Fed. Reg. 17,435, 17,474 (proposed Apr. 3, 2000); Gugliotta, supra note 123.
125. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS 3 (1999),
available at www.gao.gov/archive/1999/h299090.pdf (concluding that more information was
necessary because of the FDA's reliance on AERs as a basis for the rule and because the
FDA had based the rule in part on faulty assumptions in its cost-benefit analysis).
126. See id.
127. Id. at 11. From a random sample taken from the total amount of reports, the
General Accounting Office (GAO) determined that "[a] total of 45 percent of the AERs
lacked information on either dose, frequency, or duration, and 24 percent lacked
information on all three dimensions." Id.
128. Id. at 13-16.
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In April 2000, the FDA responded to the GAO findings by
withdrawing the dosage restrictions, the proposed one week duration
limit, and most of the labeling claims in order to conduct further study." 9
The two regulations that remained were the proposed restriction on the
combination of ephedrine alkaloids with other stimulants and the
proposed warning statements. These regulations were never
implemented, and three years later, on February 28, 2003, the FDA
announced a reopening of the comment period for the 1997 proposed
rule in its entirety.13 The FDA cited new scientific evidence contained in
the RAND Report as the impetus behind the renewal.
132
The RAND Report was an independent review of the available
literature and research concerning the effectiveness of ephedra and
ephedrine products on weight loss and athletic performance. 33  The
RAND Report concluded that short-term use of ephedra and ephedrine
products taken in combination with caffeine produce statistically
significant increases in short-term weight loss; that available evidence
suggested that "ephedrine alone ...has little or no effect on athletic
performance"; and that there was no evidence to suggest that the effects
of a drug combination of ephedrine plus caffeine was any different from
the effects of ephedra and caffeine.19 The RAND Report also cited
evidence suggesting that ephedra or ephedrine, taken with or without
caffeine, leads to a higher risk of "nausea, vomiting, psychiatric
symptoms such as anxiety and change in mood, autonomic hyperactivity,
and palpitations. '' 135 Although more serious events such as heart attacks,
129. Dietary Supplements Containing Ephedrine Alkaloids; Withdrawal in Part, 65
Fed. Reg. at 17,474-75.
130. Id. at 17,476. Had the prohibition on the combination of ephedra with other
stimulants been enacted, it is possible that Sean Riggins would not have died from
consuming a dietary supplement containing a combination of ephedra and caffeine. See
infra note 148 and accompanying text.
131. Meadows, supra note 16.
132. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., EVIDENCE ON THE SAFETY AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF EPHEDRA: IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATIONS, http://www.fda.gov/
bbs/topics/NEWS/ephedraIwhitepaper.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2004); see also
SHEKELLE ET AL., supra note 8, at 3.
133. SHEKELLE ET AL., supra note 8, at 3. The RAND Report was funded by the
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, in conjunction with the National Institute of
Health, Office of Dietary Supplements, and the National Centers for Complementary and
Alternative Medicine. Id. The RAND Report relied on reviews of clinical studies, AERs,
and case studies. Id. at v. It also reviewed fifty-two controlled clinical trials of ephedrine
or herbal ephedra products and excluded eighteen trials for a lack of sufficient duration of
study. Id. The FDA provided over 1000 AERs for ephedra products and 125 for
ephedrine products. Id. Finally, the RAND Report reviewed 18,502 case reports relating
to the dietary supplement manufacturer Metabolife. Id.
134. Id. at 202.
135. Id. at 202-03.
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seizures, and death were associated with the taking of ephedra, the
RAND Report concluded, just as the GAO had in 1999, that more
scientific studies were needed to assess the possible causal connection
because the majority of the AERs were incomplete and causal
conclusions remained undetermined from the existing evidence.
36
D. State Regulation of Ephedra
In response to the inability of the Federal Government to effectively
regulate ephedra, state governments have begun to enact legislation
banning the sale of ephedra products.'37 Almost half of the states have
regulations concerning products containing ephedrine alkaloids. 39 State
statutes regulate ephedrine alkaloid products in three situations: (1)
regulating products containing ephedrine alkaloids as precursors and
essential elements of illegal drugs; (2) regulating products containing
ephedrine alkaloids because they purport to be legal substitutes for
139
illegal drugs; and (3) banning all sales of products containing ephedra.
136. Id. The RAND Report found that "[t]he majority of FDA case reports [(AERs)]
are insufficiently documented to make an informed judgment about the relationship
between the use of ephedra-containing dietary supplements and the adverse event in
question." Id. at 203. The RAND Report also found that nearly all of the AERs provided
by Metabolife were "too poorly documented to permit us to make any judgments about
the potential relationship between ephedra use and the event." Id. The RAND Report
therefore concluded that the strongest evidence of causation would come not from AERs,
but from clinical studies. Id. at 202.
137. See Ephedra-Containing Supplements Hearings, supra note 5, at 43 (testimony of
Cynthia Culmo, former official, Texas Department of Health); Gugliotta, supra note 123.
At the hearing before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Ms. Culmo stated
that "DSHEA shifted the requirement of proving a product is unsafe to the government.
Many States have had to pick up this tremendous burden because of the apparent inability
of the Federal Government to effectively address safety issues associated with these
products." Id.; see also 148 CONG. REC. S11,674 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 2002) (statement of
Sen. Durbin). Senator Durbin stated:
Over 20 different States have enacted their own State laws restricting the sale of
products containing ephedra.
Think about that for a second. It is usually the Federal Government that
shows the leadership when it comes to protecting people against dangerous drugs
and substances sold. In this case, exactly the opposite is the case; the States have
seen the adverse consequences, the States understand the danger, and the States
are moving ahead of the Federal Government. How bad is this, that our States
are leading when it comes to national health standards, and the Federal
Government is silent? And why?
Id.
138. 148 CONG. REC. S11,674 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. Durbin).
139. See Stewart, supra note 14, at 109 (explaining that state legislation initially sought
to prohibit use of ephedrine to create illicit drugs and the recent trend sought to prohibit
products containing ephedrine which advertised that they produced a "high"); see also
Ephedra Prohibition Act, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 602/1, /5, /10, /15, /20, /25, /99 (Supp.
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The purpose behind the states' initial regulation of ephedrine was to
prevent its "use as a precursor to illegal drugs.' 4°  Ephedrine is a
component of illegal drugs such as ecstasy, and, in an effort to decrease
ecstasy production, a number of states enacted legislation closely
regulating the sale of ephedrine.14 ' The second type of state regulation
targeted dietary supplements alleging to produce the same effects as
illegal drugs.4  Florida was the first state to pass this type of regulation. 43
Florida's legislation was enacted in response to the death of Peter
Schlendorf, a twenty-year-old college student who overdosed on a
dietary supplement containing ephedra that purported to produce a
high.'4 Florida's legislation only allows the sale of ephedrine alkaloid
products by prescription.
4
-
The most recent trend in state regulation, banning the sale of all
ephedra products, is currently in effect in three states: Illinois, New York,
2004). By enacting the Ephedra Prohibition Act in May 2003, Illinois was the first state to
ban sales of all dietary supplements containing ephedra. See id.
140. See Stewart, supra note 14, at 109 (noting that ephedrine could be used in the
production of illegal drugs such as ecstasy and methamphetamine).
141. Id.; see, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SATETY CODE § 11100 (West 1991) (requiring
manufacturers and sellers of ephedrine to (1) obtain a letter of authorization and proper
identification from the potential buyer and (2) file a sales report with the Department of
Justice at least twenty-one days before the delivery of the substance).
142. See Stewart, supra note 14, at 109-10.
143. Id. at 109. Florida's statute banned dietary supplements which contained high
levels of ephedrine and purported to mimic the effects of ecstasy or produce "a 'natural
high' or increased 'cosmic consciousness."' Id. at 109-10.
144. See id. Peter, a college football player on spring break in Panama City, Florida,
ingested a dietary supplement called Ultimate Xphoria, suffered a heart arrhythmia, and
died. Michael O'Keeffe, Banning Together: Suffolk County Citizens, Pols Aim To Outlaw
Ephedra Products, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 1, 2002, at 62. Peter's parents, Tom and
Karen Schlendorf, have been vocal advocates for legislation completely banning the sale
of ephedra products since Peter's death. Ann Givens, Ephedra Ban Takes Effect: Parents
Lobbied for Stale Law, NEWSDAY, Oct. 18, 2003, at A08. The Schlendorf's also received a
$2.5 million settlement from the dietary supplement manufacturer. Id.
145. Stewart, supra note 14, at 110 (stating that Florida law also prohibits marketing a
dietary supplement containing ephedrine for "the indication of stimulation, mental
alertness, weight loss, appetite control, energy, or other indication not approved under the
FDA's OTC Final Monograph"). In response to the recent health concerns touched off by
the death of Steve Bechler, Florida has enacted legislation which bans the sale of any
weight loss dietary supplement to people under the age of eighteen. See Phil Wallace,
Illinois Ephedra Sales Ban Draws Industry Criticism, FOOD CHEMICAL NEWS June 2,
2003, at 20, 20. This ban includes dietary supplements that contain ephedra. Id. The
effectiveness of banning sales of dietary supplements to minors has been called into
question. See O'Keeffe, supra note 144. Karen Schlendorf, Peter's mother, argues that a
full ban on ephedra is needed because "'[tihere's a ban on the sale of tobacco and alcohol
to teenagers, but we know they get them without many problems. A ban on the sale of
ephedra to minors will be just as effective."' Id.
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and California. In May 2003, Illinois became the first state to ban sales
of dietary supplements containing ephedra when it enacted the Ephedra
Prohibition Act in the wake of Sean Riggins's death. 47  Sean was a
sixteen-year-old high school football player who died from a heart attack
after taking a dietary supplement containing a combination of caffeine
and ephedra.148 The Ephedra Prohibition Act bans the sale or offer of
sale, but not the use, of all dietary supplements containing ephedrine
alkaloids in the State of Illinois.49 The statute states that the purpose of
the legislation is to protect the health and safety of the residents of
Illinois. This rationale underscores the fact that neither Congress nor
146. Dangers of Dietary Supplements Hearing, supra note 14 (statement of Sen.
Richard Durbin).
147. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 602/20 (Supp. 2004). Governor Rod Blagojevich
signed the Ephedra Prohibition Act into law in the presence of Sean's parents. Wallace,
supra note 145. On June 2, 2003, the legislature in Westchester County, New York,
followed the Illinois example and banned the sale of any products with any quantity of
ephedra, excluding "any drug which contains ephedrine and which is lawfully sold,
transferred, or furnished over the counter without a prescription pursuant to the
[FDCA]." WESTCHESTER COUNTY, N.Y., LAWS OF WESTCHESTER COUNTY § 863.902,
http://www.westchestergov.com/consumer/ephedra/ephedra.htm (last visited Dec. 29,
2004). Westchester County was the second county in New York to pass legislation
banning ephedra sales. Phil Wallace, Civil Suits Mount as Food and Drug Administration
Weighs Ephedra Regulation, FOOD CHEMICAL NEWS, June 9, 2003, at 27, 27 (noting that
in New York, Suffolk County passed similar legislation on February 11, 2003).
148. L. Jon Wertheim, Jolt of Reality, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 7, 2003, at 69, 69.
The danger of products combining ephedra and other stimulants such as caffeine is
illustrated by the death of Sean Riggins. Sean died from a heart attack after consuming a
Yellow Jacket pill, a dietary supplement containing a combination of caffeine and
ephedra. Id. Intrigued as to what would cause a healthy sixteen-year-old who did not
smoke, drink, or take drugs to suffer a massive heart attack, health officials conducted an
investigation and discovered that the local high school students had a pregame ritual to
boost their energy. Id. at 69-70. This ritual was called "jacketing" and it consisted of
taking a Yellow Jacket pill while drinking a highly caffeinated beverage such as Mountain
Dew or Red Bull. Id. at 69. By the time medical officials discovered this, it was too late to
run a toxicology test on Sean's body to discover what role ephedra might have played in
Sean's death. Id. at 70, 72. Yellow Jackets were manufactured by NVE Pharmaceuticals,
and its president, Robert Occhifinto, testified before Congress that his company had never
employed a medical doctor, pharmacologist, or chemist to formulate any of the company's
ephedra-containing products. See Ephedra-Containing Supplements Hearings, supra note
5, at 119, 121-22 (testimony of Robert Occhifinto, President, NVE Pharmaceuticals).
Instead, Mr. Occhifinto-a man with no college, medical, or any other graduate degree in
pharmacology, chemistry, or nutrition-created the formulas himself. Id. at 121-22.
Incidentally, Mr. Occinfinto has a criminal record with a conviction for money laundering
for a deal that involved selling synthetic ephedrine to a known methamphetamine dealer.
Id. at 122.
149. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 602/20 (Supp. 2004). Legally sold drug products
containing ephedrine alkaloids are exempted by the ban. Id.
150. Id. § 602/10. In addition to Sean's death, the Illinois Legislature relied on the
number of significant adverse events reported for ephedra products, and the fact that
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the FDA has enacted legislation applicable to protect the health and
safety of all residents of the United States from dietary supplementsS 151
containing ephedra.
II. THE FAILURE OF THE CURRENT REGULATORY SYSTEM UNDER
DSHEA
A. Limitations on the FDA's Ability to Regulate Ephedra
DSHEA placed the burden of proof on the FDA to show that a dietary
supplement is a "significant or unreasonable risk" before it can be taken
off the market.5 2 The FDA is therefore charged with investigating and
making the case that this burden has been met. The FDA first attempted
to regulate dietary supplements containing ephedra in 1997.153 The FDA
withdrew this initial attempt in 2000 due to the GAO Report, which
called for more causal evidence linking ephedra products to the reported
adverse events.
154
Three years later, in February 2003, the FDA reproposed the rule
citing the RAND Report, a comprehensive evaluation of all available
data on products containing ephedra and ephedrine alkaloids, as new
evidence. Nevertheless, the RAND Report, like the GAO, concluded
ephedra products had been banned in a number of countries and by a large number of
professional sports, to determine that ephedra was a health risk. Id. § 602/5. Specifically,
the statute noted that the National Collegiate Athletic Association, National Football
League (NFL), International Olympic Committee, the U.S. Army, Canada, Britain,
Germany, and Australia had all banned the use of ephedra products. Id. § 602/5(7)-(9). In
addition to the NFL, Major League Soccer also bans the use of ephedra, Ephedra-
Containing Supplements Hearings, supra note 5, at 199 (testimony of Donald P. Garber,
Commissioner, Major League Soccer), and while NASCAR does not ban it, it does test to
ensure that drivers do not exceed a preset limit, id. at 198-99 (testimony of Mike Helton,
President, NASCAR). Conspicuously absent from the list, especially in light of Steve
Bechler's death, is professional baseball. Although minor league baseball bans dietary
supplements containing ephedra, Major League Baseball does not. Id. at 207 (testimony
of Robert D. Manfred, Jr., Executive Vice President, Labor Relations/Human Resources,
Major League Baseball). The Players Association's position is "that the players should
not be prohibited from using any substances that the U.S. Government has effectively
determined are not unsafe for consumption by other American consumers." Id. at 211
(statement of Rep. James C. Greenwood, Chairman, House Subcomm. on Oversight &
Investigations).
151. See Ephedra-Containing Supplements Hearings, supra note 5, at 43 (testimony of
Cynthia Culmo, former official, Texas Department of Health).
152. 21 U.S.C. § 342(f) (2000).
153. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text (detailing the provisions of the
1997 proposed rule).
154. See supra notes 124-29 and accompanying text (explaining that the GAO
questioned the proposed rule due to the FDA's reliance on AERs).
155. See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
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that more scientific research was needed to establish a causal
relationship.1 6  Therefore, the "significant or unreasonable risk"
standard is highly suspect as applied to dietary supplements containing
ephedrine alkaloids and will almost certainly require a judicial
interpretation. 7 The fact that after nearly a decade of investigation, the
FDA has been unable to answer the question of whether there is enough
evidence to prove that dietary supplements containing ephedra pose a
"significant or unreasonable risk" illustrates the FDA's inability to
perform the oversight function that DSHEA thrust upon it.'
1. Adverse Event Reports (AERs)
The main roadblock in the FDA's ability to maintain the burden of
proof is its inability to effectively gather evidence. 5 1 Mark McClellan,
Commissioner of the FDA, testified repeatedly in front of the House
Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection that
under DHSEA the FDA cannot compel the production of the data that
would enable the agency to determine whether a dietary supplement is
156. See SHEKELLE ET AL., supra note 8, at 201-05; supra note 136 and accompanying
text.
157. See Ephedra-Containing Supplements Hearings, supra note 5, at 245, 247-48
(testimony of Hon. Mark B. McClellan, Commissioner, FDA). Mr. McClellan attributed
part of the delay in promulgating ephedra regulations to the fact that no court had ever
ruled on the "significant or unreasonable risk" standard, leaving the FDA with the
difficult task of gathering evidence for an undefined legal standard. Id. In 2003, the FDA
released its interpretation of the standard:
"Unreasonable risk" clearly implies a risk-benefit calculus. Such a calculus
should be able to examine the available scientific evidence and take it into
account in assessing whether the product's known or suspected risks outweigh its
known or suspected benefits, in light of the claims the product makes or under
ordinary conditions of use.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 132.
158. But see Stephen H. McNamara & A. Wes Siegner, Jr., FDA Has Substantial and
Sufficient Authority To Regulate Dietary Supplements, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 15, 15 (2002)
(arguing that the FDA's existing regulatory power under DSHEA is adequate and that
DSHEA need not be amended).
159. See Ephedra-Containing Supplements Hearings, supra note 5, at 233-34, 247, 249-
50 (testimony of Hon. Mark B. McClellan, Commissioner, FDA); see also Dangers of
Dietary Supplements Hearing, supra note 14 (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin). Senator
Hatch, one of the main sponsors of DSHEA, believes that DSHEA provides the FDA
with sufficient tools to remove unsafe products from the marketplace and the current
regulatory problem with dietary supplements results from the FDA's lack of proper
implementation of DSHEA. Id. (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch, Chairman, Judiciary
Comm.). Senator Hatch further argues that while the FDA is at fault, the lack of
implementation of DSHEA is not completely the FDA's fault because the agency lacks
adequate resources, such as funds, to investigate potentially harmful dietary supplements.
Id.
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safe.1'6 DSHEA does not require dietary supplement manufacturers to
maintain standardized adverse event reports or to turn the reports over
to the FDA. 16  As a result, the FDA must ask manufacturers to
voluntarily turn over potentially damaging information when they are
under no legal obligation to do so.' 6 The extraordinary lengths through
which the FDA had to go to gather information on ephedra products
demonstrates the problem with this method of fact finding. The FDA
ultimately resorted to bringing criminal charges against Metabolife
International in order to gain access to the company's AERs.'6 Once
Metabolife turned over the AERs, they were of little use because
Metabolife redacted pertinent information.'6 It was not until July 2003,
one year later, that Metabolife finally turned over the unredacted
AERs 66 In addition to the potential for undue delay from self-serving
manufacturers, another concern with AERs is that there is no guarantee
that the AERs will provide complete or accurate information because
DSHEA does not require standardized forms. 16 7 The GAO and the
RAND Report both documented concerns about relying on adverse
event reports as evidence for a proposed rule because the AERs were
often incomplete, inaccurate, or contradictory. This means that in
160. Ephedra-Containing Supplements Hearings, supra note 5, at 233-34, 247, 249-50
(testimony of Hon. Mark B. McClellan, Commissioner, FDA).
161. See id. (differentiating the drug approval process which requires post-market
reporting requirements from the approval process of dietary supplements).
162. Id.; see also Agency Information Collection Activities; Submission for OMB
Review; Comment Request; Medwatch: The FDA Medical Products Reporting Program,
65 Fed. Reg. 69,314, 69,315 (Nov. 16, 2000) (noting that the FDA "is totally dependent on
voluntary reporting by health professionals and consumers about problems with the use of
dietary supplements").
163. See Ephedra-Containing Supplements Hearings, supra note 5, at 249-50 (testimony
of Hon. Mark B. McClellan, Commissioner, FDA); see also Colloton, supra note 14, at 536
(discussing how the FDA had to purchase samples of ephedra products in order to do
research on them because DSHEA does not require dietary supplement manufacturers to
provide the FDA with label or ingredient information).
164. Ephedra- Containing Supplements Hearings, supra note 5, at 250 (testimony of
Hon. Mark B. McClellan, Commissioner, FDA).
165. See id.
166. Id.
167. See Ephedra-Containing Supplements Hearings, supra note 5, at 233-34 (testimony
of Hon. Mark B. McClellan, Commissioner, FDA).
168. See supra notes 127-28, 136 and accompanying text. The RAND Report found
that many of the AERs acquired from the dietary supplement manufacturers were
unusable because they did not contain enough pertinent information:
The information was not recorded in an organized fashion, leaving it up to us to
interpret its meaning. A good example of this was MIPER 23695 that we (but
not Metabolife) classified as a "death." This file consisted of handwritten notes
that stated, "migraine HA, wants refund, sister's husb died." Does this mean the
customer is the sister's husband, who had a migraine and then died? Or did the
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order for the FDA to prove that a dietary supplement is a "significant or
unreasonable risk" the evidence must come from scientific data.
2. Scientific Studies
The RAND Report noted that the strongest causal evidence showing
that a dietary supplement containing ephedra has caused the reputed
harm should come from clinical studies; however, the studies conducted
on ephedra did not contain a large enough sample of the population "to
adequately assess the possibility of rare outcomes."'6 9  The FDA
acknowledged that more studies would be useful, but that any study
would be expensive and take years to complete and analyze . 7
Prohibitive cost and undue delay may not pose the biggest hurdle for the
FDA in regulating dietary supplements. The biggest hurdle could be that
any new research may be unethical because of the suspected harm posed
by ephedra products.17' Given that the FDA has published reports
concerning the fear that consumption of ephedra increases the risk of
heart attack, stroke, and psychotic episodes, and medical reports have
confirmed this fear, it may be unethical for the FDA to condone the type
of long-term studies that are needed. In the event that such tests could
customer have a migraine headache, perhaps in part because her sister's husband
died? Without additional information it is impossible to tell.
SHEKELLE ET AL., supra note 8, at 199. Senator Durbin, upon review of another
Metabolife AER, stated that it resembled a "doodle pad." 148 CONG. REC. S11,6723
(daily ed. Nov. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. Durbin).
169. SHEKELLE ET AL., supra note 8, at 202.
170. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 132 (stating that "[w]hile additional
studies of ephedra's safety and efficiency would clearly be useful, it is unlikely that any
studies that could be conducted or completed, at least in the near term, would be powerful
enough to resolve these safety questions"). The FDA further noted that "[i]t would take
some years for such a study to accumulate enough cases to have the statistical power to
detect a significant difference in serious adverse events." Id.
171. See id. (stating that "[e]ven if a very costly, definitive large randomized clinical
trial could be funded, it might be unethical to carry it out, given the risks suspected from
ephedra and the likelihood that its health benefits are modest at best"); Ephedra-
Containing Supplements Hearings, supra note 5, at 33 (testimony of Raymond Woosley,
Vice President for Health Sciences, Arizona Health Sciences Center). Woosley testified
that it would be unethical to conduct further tests on ephedra given its known health risks.
Id. Cynthia Culmo, former director for Drugs and Medical Devices for the Texas
Department of Health, agrees with Woosley and testified that the only ethical step would
be to ban ephedra products. Id. at 44.
172. See Ephedra-Containing Supplements Hearings, supra note 5, at 33 (testimony of
Raymond Woosley, Vice President for Health Sciences, Arizona Health Sciences Center);
id. at 103 (testimony of Carol Boozer, Obesity Research Center, St. Luke's Roosevelt
Hospital); see also Bent et al., supra note 8, at 470 (concluding that "the risk for an adverse
reaction after the use of ephedra is substantially greater than with other herbal products.
The sale of ephedra as a dietary supplement should be restricted or banned to prevent
serious adverse reactions in the general population"); Christine A. Haller & Neal L.
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be conducted, it is unlikely that the test results would provide an
adequate representation to the public. 73 Furthermore, given the risks
associated with ephedra, any such test would include intense
prescreening of subjects to ensure that the subjects do not have any
underlying health risks that may be aggravated by the consumption of
ephedra.i74 Any prescreening would effectively ensure that only healthy,
nonrisk subjects are a part of the test. '75 However, this is not how
companies market and sell dietary supplements; they are available to the
entire public regardless of the health of the individual) 76 In fact, many
dietary supplements are taken to improve the health of individuals."'
Therefore, the results from tests of prescreened healthy individuals in
clinical trials, where the test regulates variables such as caffeine
consumption, probably are not going to be representative of the average
American.
Benowitz, Adverse Cardiovascular and Central Nervous System Events Associated with
Dietary Supplements Containing Ephedra Alkaloids, 343 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1833, 1838
(2000) (concluding that the use of "dietary supplements that contain ephedra alkaloids
pose a serious health risk to some users").
173. See Ephedra-Containing Supplements Hearings, supra note 5, at 32-33 (testimony
of Raymond Woosley, Vice President for Health Sciences, Arizona Health Sciences
Center). Woosley argued that scientific studies are "not even relevant to the way ephedra
is used in this nation today . . . [b]ecause these products are taken as nonprescription
dietary supplements and they are used without any medical supervision or medical
screening." Id. Additionally, Representative Diana DeGette identified that, unlike
controlled scientific studies, the government cannot limit the distribution of dietary
supplements to people who may be least susceptible to the product's adverse effects. See
id. at 129 (Rep. Diana DeGette, Member, Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations).
174. See id. at 33 (testimony of Raymond Woosley, Vice President for Health Sciences,
Arizona Health Sciences Center).
175. Id. For example, Woosley stated that
in the study by Boozer et al., it is often cited as evidence for the safety of these
products, the investigators excluded one of every 10 subjects that they
interviewed because they had medical conditions that made ephedra and the
caffeine product combination that they were studying, in their estimation unsafe.
ld. Dr. Boozer is an accomplished doctor in the areas of nutrition and obesity who
conducted two studies of ephedra products and found that ephedra with caffeine led to
weight loss in the short term. Id. at 103-04 (testimony of Carol Boozer, Obesity Research
Center, St. Luke's Roosevelt Hospital). However, Dr. Boozer would not say that her
studies showed ephedra was safe nor would she recommend its use for anyone out of the
particular parameters of her test subjects, namely otherwise healthy prescreened
overweight men and women. Id. at 143-44.
176. Id. at 145-46, 158.
177. Dangers of Dietary Supplements Hearing, supra note 14 (statement of Sen. Orrin
Hatch, Chairman, Judiciary Comm.).
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B. Current Good Manufacturing Practices (CGMP)
The proposed CGMP would set minimum specifications for purity,
identity, quality, strength, and composition for dietary supplements and
require that the product and label accurately reflect these
specifications. 1 7 " The CGMP would also require the supplement
manufacturer to monitor the products through AERs and submit them to
the FDA. 79 The problem with the CGMP, however, is that it does not
address the main issue with dietary supplements, namely their safety.' 8°
The CGMP does not regulate the safety of dietary supplements because
compliance with the CGMP ensures only the safety of the process of
making and packaging the dietary supplement, not that the dietary
supplement itself is sound.1 8 Similarly, the AERs that the manufacturers
would have to monitor and report would pertain to the process of
making the product, not the product itself. 182 The CGMP is a step in the
right direction for consumers of dietary supplements, and long overdue
according to many; however, the CGMP does not address the key issue:
whether the dietary supplement itself is safe. Therefore, an additional
solution is needed.
C. State Regulation
The states have been more successful than the FDA at regulating
products containing ephedrine alkaloids.'83 The most recent trend in
state legislation, banning the sale of all ephedra products, has two
limitations: (1) the laws only ban the sale of ephedra in the state, not its
use; and (2) the laws only specifically regulate ephedra products, not all
dietary supplements.' 84 By banning the sale of ephedra products, state
laws have placed a stumbling block in front of their residents' access to
such products.'8 However, other avenues of supply, such as purchasing
ephedra products in sister states or over the Internet, still provide the
178. See supra notes 106-15 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 112.
180. See Current Good Manufacturing Practice in Manufacturing, Packing, or Holding
Dietary Ingredients and Dietary Supplements, 68 Fed. Reg. 12,158, 12,164 (proposed Mar.
13, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 111-12).
181. Id. (stating that "[c]ompliance with any final rule, based on the [COMP] proposal,
will not ensure that the dietary ingredient or dietary supplement itself is safe or
effective").
182. Id.
183. Compare supra notes 137-51 and accompanying text with notes 116-36 (describing
the success states have had implementing ephedra regulation laws and the difficulty the
FDA has had in attempting to regulate ephedra).
184. See Stewart, supra note 14, at 109-10.
185. See Dangers of Dietary Supplements Hearing, supra note 14 (discussion between
Senators John McCain and Richard Dubin).
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public with access to the products. 6 The other shortcoming with state
regulations applying only to ephedra products is that nothing prevents
manufacturers from simply substituting another unproven dietary
supplement ingredient for the ephedra. Already, manufacturers of
ephedra products are marketing their products as "ephedra free."' 88
These ephedra free products contain ephedra substitutes, many of which
have the same pharmacological effects of ephedra and are not safety
tested. '89 As these two limitations of state regulations show, in order to
effectively solve the dietary supplement quandary, the solution must
apply across the board to the entire country and to all dietary
supplements.
III. WHY CONGRESS NEEDS TO AMEND DSHEA AND NOT MERELY
BAN DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS CONTAINING EPHEDRA
The attempts by the FDA and the states to regulate dietary
supplements containing ephedra illustrate the shortcomings of
DSHEA.'90 The FDA, constrained by DSHEA, has been working on
ephedra regulation for nearly ten years and to date, has not implemented
186. See id. Senators Durbin and McCain discussed the fact that Health Canada,
Canada's equivalent to the FDA, had banned the sale of ephedra products nearly two
years before. Id. They theorized that the ban made it more difficult, but not impossible,
for people to acquire ephedra products through the Internet. Id.
187. Andrea Petersen, The Search for the Next Diet Elixir, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2003,
at D1 (noting that consumers have already begun to purchase ephedra free alternatives
and that "[tlhe alternatives are made from substances such as bitter orange, green tea and
banaba ... While preliminary science indicates that some of them may help people lose
weight, there are few studies that prove they are safe and effective").
188. Press Release, United States Senate, Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY), Schumer:
Banning Ephedra Great First Step, Now We Must Clamp Down on Copycats Before New
Deaths Occur (May 9, 2003), http://schumer.senate.gov/SchumerWebsite/pressrooml
press.releases/PRO1688. Senator Schumer listed
over 30 products now being sold or on their way to the market that are touted as
"ephedra-free" alternatives to products. Schumer noted that the six most
popular ephedra copycats are: Betalean Ephedra-Free from Experimental and
Applied Sciences, Inc.
Hydroxycut Ephedra Free from Muscletech Research and Development
Stacker 2 Ephedra Free from NVE Pharmaceuticals
Takeoff Hi-Energy Fat-Burner-Ephedra Free from Maximum Health
Performance Inc.
Total Lean Ephedra-Free from the General Nutrition Corporation
Xenadrine EFX Ephedrine Free from Cytodine Technologies[.]
Id. (emphasis added). NVE Pharmaceuticals manufactured the Yellow Jacket dietary
supplement that Sean Riggins ingested prior to his death. See Wertheim, supra note 148.
Xenadrine with ephedra was the dietary supplement that, according to the autopsy report,
contributed to Steve Bechler's death. See supra, note 7.
189. See Press Release, supra note 188.
190. See supra Part II.
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a rule. 9' The states, not constrained by DSHEA, have been more
successful than the FDA in regulating dietary supplements containing
ephedra, including a total ban in three states.'9 The downside of state
legislation is that the legislation is not applicable to all states or all
dietary supplements.' 93 The shortcomings of the FDA and the state
attempts at regulation make it paramount that Congress act to create
new legislation.
The simplest but least likely amendment to DSHEA would require
dietary supplements, like drugs and food additives, to have premarket
approval. This amendment is the least likely because Congress has
historically held that the American public should have wide access to
dietary supplements.'" Another reason this amendment is unlikely is
because of the political influence of the dietary supplement industry.'9 5
191. See supra Part I.
192. See supra notes 137-51 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 183-89 and accompanying text.
194. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 342 (2000). The legislative findings of DSHEA note:
(13) although the Federal Government should take swift action against
products that are unsafe or adulterated, the Federal Government should not take
any actions to impose unreasonable regulatory barriers limiting or slowing the
flow of safe products and accurate information to consumers;
(14) dietary supplements are safe within a broad range of intake, and safety
problems with the supplements are relatively rare; and
(15)(A) legislative action that protects the right of access of consumers to
safe dietary supplements is necessary in order to promote wellness ....
Dietary Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417 § 2(13)-(15)(A), 108 Stat.
4325, 4326.
195. See Gugliotta, supra note 123. Dietary supplement manufacturers have
aggressively resisted any attempt to regulate their products using a number of means to
combat legislation such as "high-paid lobbyists and increasing campaign contributions to
influence and support friendly politicians; high-profile ads to sway public opinion; grass-
roots letter-writing campaigns to pressure government agencies; and rapid-response
denials to any news or academic report describing ephedra's dangers." Id.; O'Keeffe,
supra note 144, at 62. The author noted that
[t]he dietary-supplement industry has spent millions on campaign donations and
includes congressional powerbrokers such as Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) and
Rep. Dan Burton (R-Ind.) among its supporters. Retailers and multi-level
marketers can quickly mobilize thousands of supporters to send a flood of letters,
phone calls and E-mails to legislators. Metabolife and other industry giants
intimidate critics with lawsuits and an army of high-powered lobbyists.
Id.; see also 148 CONG. REC. S11,674 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. Durbin).
Senator Durbin stated:
[T]he dietary supplement[] industry-is a big political player. When I called for
this hearing on ephedra products, and particularly Metabolife, to investigate
these adverse event reports and that cases that were showing up in court[,[ I will
tell you this: In 20 years of service on Capitol Hill, I have never faced more
political pressure in my life. I have taken on the big tobacco companies and
other pretty big players. On this one, all of a sudden, my colleagues were saying:
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As the findings of DSHEA noted, the dietary supplement industry is a
multi-billion dollar industry and an integral part of the U.S. economy.196
In June 2003, The Wall Street Journal reported that the dietary
supplement industry was an $18.4 billion dollar industry.'97  Requiring
premarket approval for all dietary supplements would effectively grind
the dietary supplement industry to a halt because all dietary supplement
manufacturers would have to apply for premarket certification, and an
overwhelmed FDA would be unable to act quickly to handle the requests
efficiently.'98 Another concern with requiring premarket approval is that
it may push the cost of dietary supplements too high for the average
consumer because manufacturers would need to raise the cost to cover
the added expense of the premarket approval process.9 Finally,
requiring premarket approval of all dietary supplements would be too
severe given the fact that many dietary supplements are safe and have
been proven to be safe over the years.200
A less severe amendment to DSHEA would be to narrow the
definition of dietary supplement. DSHEA expanded the definition of
Dick, are you sure you want to have a hearing about Metabolife? Do you realize
what a big political player they are and this industry is? Do you realize how good
they have been to our party? Do you realize this person and that person is
associated with them?
Id.
196. See supra note 96 (noting that when DSHEA was enacted, the dietary supplement
industry consistently had a positive trade balance and was a four billion dollar industry).
197. See Petersen, supra note 187. Petersen also reported that the weight loss sector of
the dietary supplement industry was worth $3.6 billion and that ephedra products
accounted for thirty-three percent of that amount. Id.
198. See Dangers of Dietary Supplements Hearing, supra note 14 (statement of Sen.
Orrin Hatch, Chairman, Judiciary Comm.) (stating that the FDA is currently
undermanned and underfunded to handle the investigative burden of DSHEA).
199. Id. (stating that "there are a number of current bureaucrats at the FDA who hate
dietary supplements and want to get pre-market approval, which would drive the costs of
Vitamin C and other vitamins and minerals and even herbal products out of sight").
200. See supra note 194 (stating that the findings of DSHEA noted that dietary
supplements are widely known to be safe). A possible solution to this concern would be to
create an exemption for dietary supplements which have a history of "safe use"; however,
ephedra would have met such an exception because of its history of use dating back over
5000 years. See supra note 8. This demonstrates the deficiency with "safe use" exceptions,
namely, that a number of dietary supplement manufacturers do not manufacture dietary
supplements in a manner that conforms to the way the substances have been safely used
through the years. See Ephedra-Containing Supplements Hearings, supra note 5, at 229-34
(testimony of Hon. Mark B. McClellan, Commissioner, FDA) (explaining that historically,
ephedra products used medicinally in China consisted of low concentrations of ephedra
alkaloids). Therefore, any "safe use" exception would need to set standards for
composition and dosage limitations that would ensure that the dietary supplement would
be manufactured and used in a manner consistent with its history. See id. at 229, 231, 233-
35.
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dietary supplements to include herbs and other botanicals, amino acids,
and any other "dietary substance for use by man to supplement the
diet., 20 1  Prior to DSHEA, the FDA considered only substances
"composed of essential nutrients" to be dietary supplements. 2
Opposition to this definition led the FDA to propose defining a dietary
supplement as "a food, other than a conventional food, that supplies a
component with nutritive value to supplement the diet by increasing the
total dietary intake of that substance., 20 3 In proposing this definition, the
FDA specifically mentioned herbs as an example of substances that
should not be considered dietary supplements because they generally
lack significant amounts of essential nutrients2 0 Congress could amend
the definition of dietary supplements by excluding some categories of
dietary supplements, such as herbs, botanicals, and steroids, and
requiring the excluded categories to obtain premarket approval. If
herbs and botanicals were excluded from the definition of dietary
supplements, then products containing ephedra could be required to
demonstrate their safety before they are allowed back onto the market.
20
201. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text; see also Dangers of Dietary
Supplements Hearing, supra note 14 (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin). Senator Durbin
stated:
[Y]ou remember when DSHEA was being debated, and I do, too. We talked
about Vitamin C and multiple vitamins and garlic and the basic things that
frankly cause no problems to anyone. Did anyone in the course of that debate
imagine we'd be reaching a point where we'd be selling, under the name of
dietary supplements, these witches' brews of chemicals that no one has ever
tested in terms of their safety and efficacy?
Id.
202. Labeling; General Requirements for Health Claims for Foods, 56 Fed. Reg.
60,537 60,543 (proposed Nov. 27, 1991).
203. Id. at 60,542-43.
204. Id. at 60,543.
205. See Dangers of Dietary Supplements Hearing, supra note 14 (statement of Sen.
Richard Dubin). Senator Durbin sponsored the Dietary Supplement Safety Act (DSSA)
of 2003 currently before the Senate. S. 722, 108th Cong. (2003). The DSSA would restrict
from the definition of dietary supplements substances such as steroids and stimulants. Id.
§§ 3-4. Senator Durbin's bill would also exempt certain types of stimulants, such as
caffeine, but the Senator noted: "We know by human experience the difference between
decaf and regular coffee, regular coffee and espresso, caffeine-free Coke and regular
Coke. But the average consumer walking into the drugstore won't know that the diet pill
Zanrex-3 contains the equivalent stimulant of a six-pack of Coke in each pill." Dangers of
Dietary Supplements Hearing, supra note 14 (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin); S. 722 §
3.
206. See Dangers of Dietary Supplements Hearing, supra note 14 (testimony of Dr.
Arthur Grollman, Distinguished Professor, Pharmacological Sciences and Medicine). Dr.
Grollman testified that DSHEA allows the incorrect labeling of botanical substances as
dietary supplements and that many of these substances "include highly toxic and even
some carcinogenic herbs creating a serious public health hazard." Id.
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This approach would limit the number of dietary supplements that
require premarket approval and lessen the burden on the FDA of
certifying the products.'O'
Another possible solution would be to amend DSHEA to empower
the FDA to be effective investigators. DSHEA implemented a
postmarket review framework for dietary supplements, and in such a
framework, the FDA must have access to adverse event reports if it is to
adequately review the industry.0 8 This would require the FDA to have
the power to compel the production of scientific data and adverse event
reports.209 A corollary amendment would be for Congress to develop a
standardized form for adverse event reports and require that dietary
supplement manufacturers accurately record them.210 Congress should
also require dietary supplement manufacturers to register their products
and labeling claims with the FDA.2 1 ' The FDA would have more
efficiency in the search for products which fail to meet safety standards.'
Although the FDA would be in a stronger position to enforce DSHEA
under these amendments, it would take years for the FDA to gather the
207. See id. Senator Hatch, an ardent supporter of DSHEA, and Senator Durbin, an
ardent supporter of revising DSHEA, both agreed that the FDA currently does not have
the resources to adequately investigate all dietary supplements. Id.
208. See Ephedra-Containing Supplements Hearing, supra note 5, at 233-34 (testimony
of Hon. Mark B. McClellan, Commissioner, FDA); see also Dangers of Dietary
Supplements Hearing, supra note 14 (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin). Senator Durbin
referred to the lack of mandatory AERs as an "obvious weakness[] in DSHEA." Id.
Senator Durbin's proposed bill, the DSSA, would require dietary supplement
manufacturers to develop review procedures for AERs and submit to the FDA any AERs
that disclose a serious adverse event, such as death or other serious adverse health
conditions resulting in hospitalization or persistent disability. S. 722 § 2.
209. See Ephedra-Containing Supplements Hearings, supra note 5, at 230 (testimony of
Hon. Mark B. McClellan, Commissioner, FDA); Agency Information Collection
Activities; Submission for OMB Review; Comment Request; Medwatch: The FDA
Medical Products Reporting Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 69,314, 69,315 (Nov. 16, 2000).
210. See Ephedra-Containing Supplements Hearings, supra note 5, at 43-44 (testimony
of Cyntha Culmo, former official, Texas Department of Health); Agency Information
Collection Activities; Submission for OMB Review; Comment Request; Medwatch: The
FDA Medical Products Reporting Program, 65 Fed. Reg. at 69,315 (noting that the FDA
requires mandatory reporting of adverse events for drug, biologic, and medical device
products).
211. See Ephedra-Containing Supplements Hearings, supra note 5, at 43-44 (testimony
of Cyntha Culmo, former official, Texas Department of Health); Colloton, supra note 14,
at 547-50 (arguing that registration of dietary supplement manufacturers and their
products would not be overly burdensome on the dietary supplement industry).
212. See Colloton, supra note 14, at 547-50.
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needed evidence against potentially harmful dietary supplements and
then move to ban the product.
21 3
The most likely, but least effective, solution would be for Congress or
the FDA to ban ephedra completely. As with the state laws that ban the
sale of ephedra, this type of solution is shortsighted in that it would only
treat a symptom of the illness, not the illness itself, namely the failure of
214the regulatory framework under DSHEA. This solution may be
irrelevant by the time it is passed because the states and public have
started to enact their own solutions while the FDA and Congress debate;
three states have banned the sale of ephedra products outright, and
recently major drug store chains such as Rite Aid, CVS, and Wal-Mart
have refused to sell dietary supplements containing ephedra."5 A
number of dietary supplement manufacturers, including General
Nutrition Centers (GNC) and Twinlab, have stopped manufacturing
dietary supplements with ephedra.1 6 Although this is probably a self-
serving attempt to avoid escalating insurance costs due to the rising
number of deaths and lawsuits associated with ephedra products, the
manufacturers themselves have removed ephedra products from the
market, something that neither Congress nor the FDA have been able to
217
accomplish.
The current regulatory framework for dietary supplements is
analogous to the regulatory framework for food additives prior to
213. Cf. supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text (reporting that the FAA was passed
in order to close a similar loophole in regulatory law which allowed substances defined as
food additives to be added to food without premarket approval).
214. See supra Part 11.
215. Dangers of Dietary Supplements Hearing, supra note 14. (statement of Sen.
Richard Durbin).
216. See O'Keeffe, supra note 144, at 62; Petersen, supra note 187.
217. See Petersen, supra note 187. Petersen notes that
companies continue to pull their ephedra products off store shelves on their own,
after being hit with consumer lawsuits or seeing their insurance premiums
skyrocket. "The insurance industry has been able to do what the FDA hasn't,"
says Mark Blumenthal, executive director of the American Botanical Council, a
nonprofit herbal education group.
Id. (emphasis added); see also O'Keeffe, supra note 144 (explaining that dietary
supplement manufacturer "Herbalife decided earlier this year to discontinue sales of
ephedra after its premiums jumped to $2.5 million in 2001 up from $400,000 in 2000" and
that "Twinlab cited 'escalating insurance costs and regulatory uncertainties' when it
announced that it will stop all sales of ephedra products"). Recent judgments against
ephedra manufacturers have awarded plaintiffs large sums of money and have encouraged
similar suits. See Wallace, supra note 147, at 27 (noting that many civil suits have been
filed against ephedra manufacturers, including a nationwide lawsuit filed on behalf of all
ephedra users in a U.S. district court in Illinois).
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Congress's enactment of the FAA in 1958.2"8 A loophole exists for
dietary supplements allowing a manufacturer to put a product on the
market without proving that it is safe; the burden is on the FDA to prove
the product is unsafe before it can be removed from the market.2 9 As
the FDA's battle to regulate ephedra indicates, this is a time consuming
process, during which time the dangerous product remains on the
market. The best solution is one that would allow the public access to
only safe dietary supplements. Congress should amend the definition of
dietary supplements to remove unproven substances such as herbs and
221botanicals and require these products to obtain premarket approval.
At the same time, Congress needs to increase the regulatory power of the
FDA by giving it the power to obtain standardized AERs from dietary
supplement manufacturers who would also be required to register their
products and labeling claims with the FDA. This combination would
ensure that safe dietary supplements are available to the public, enable
the FDA to be more effective investigators, and allow dietary
supplement manufacturers a chance to put potentially harmful
substances on the market by proving their safety.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Comment has argued that the current regulatory scheme for
dietary supplements under DSHEA has created a dangerous situation
where unsafe dietary supplements are sold to unsuspecting consumers.
The failures of the existing law are demonstrated through the health risks
presented by dietary supplements containing ephedrine alkaloids and the
FDA's inability to remove these products from the market. In response
to the inability of the Federal Government to protect consumers from
unsafe dietary supplements such as ephedra products, state governments
have passed legislation protecting their residents. Although state
legislation, and potentially federal legislation-if the FDA enacts a
ban-will adequately protect the American public from the dangers of
ephedra products, a need still exists for Congress to enact legislation that
will protect all Americans from all unsafe dietary supplements. In an
effort to prevent the death of the next Steve Bechler, Scan Riggins, or
218. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text (discussing how prior to enactment
of the FAA, Congress believed that a loophole existed in regulatory law because unsafe
food additives were allowed to stay on the market while the FDA built a case against it).
219. Id.
220. See Ephedra-Containing Supplements Hearings, supra note 5, at 32 (testimony of
Raymond Woosley, Vice President for Health Sciences, Arizona Health Sciences Center)
(lamenting that while the RAND analysis was being conducted, people needlessly died as
ephedra products were still on the market).
221. See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
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Peter Schlendorf, this Comment has proposed that Congress amend the
definition of dietary supplement in DSHEA to limit the broad range of
untested substances currently allowed, and has called for an increase in
the regulatory power of the FDA in order to allow the agency to be more
effective in carrying its burden under DSHEA.
V. ADDENDUM
On February 6, 2004, after nearly ten years of study, the FDA issued a
final rule concluding that dietary supplements containing ephedrine
alkaloids are adulterated because they "present an unreasonable risk of
, ,222 r l
illness or injury. This rule effectively bans the manufacture or sale of
dietary supplements containing ephedrine alkaloids, and thus ephedra.2 2 3
In reaching its determination, the FDA adopted a balancing test as the
proper standard to determine whether an "unreasonable risk" exists.224
The unreasonable risk standard requires a "relative weighing of the
product's known and reasonably likely risks against its known and
reasonably likely benefits." 225
The FDA found dietary supplements containing ephedrine alkaloids to
be an unreasonable risk because of the lack of scientific data supporting
health benefits and the fact that use of ephedra products increased the
risk of stroke and heart attack by causing an increase in blood pressure
226
and heart rate. This rule banning ephedra became effective on April
12, 2004.27 Two dietary supplement manufacturers, NVE
Pharmaceuticals and the National Institute for Clinical Weight Loss,
sued the FDA in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey
for a temporary injunction against the rule going into effect. 2  Although
the court denied the injunction, further litigation on the legality of the
rule is likely.229
222. 21 C.F.R. § 119.1 (2004).
223. Final Rule Declaring Dietary Supplements Containing Ephedrine Alkaloids
Adulterated Because They Present an Unreasonable Risk, 69 Fed. Reg. 6788, 6788
(proposed Feb. 11, 2004) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 119).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 6789.
227. Press Release, FDA Announces Rule Prohibiting Sale of Dietary Supplements
Containing Ephedrine Alkaloids Effective (Apr. 12, 2004), http://www.fda.gov/
bbs/topics/News/2004lNEW01050.html.
228. Id.; see also Marc Kaufman, FDA Ban on Ephedra Upheld by Federal Judge,
WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2004, at A6.
229. See Kaufman, supra note 228; Press Release, supra note 227.
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The day the rule was published, the FDA posted questions and
answers regarding the new rule.'30 The explanations to the questions
"Why didn't the FDA reach this conclusion sooner?" and "What has the
FDA been doing to meet the requirements to take action under the
dietary supplement law?" are defensive and further illustrate the failure
of the current dietary supplement regulatory system.23 The FDA
explains that under DSHEA the FDA has the burden of proof to
establish that dietary supplements are unsafe, but the "FDA has no
authority to require any studies of safety or effectiveness for dietary
supplements.2 32 The FDA then defends the ten years of work it put into
banning ephedra by stating that the "FDA has gone to great lengths to
obtain and review all of the relevant scientific evidence on ephedra, as
well as adverse event information, even though FDA's legal authorities to
obtain this information are limited.,233 The ban on ephedra therefore has
ended the threat posed by dietary supplements containing ephedra;
however, the need for Congress to act to protect consumers from the
dangers of other untested dietary supplements remains.
230. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT FDA's
ACTIONS ON DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS CONTAINING EPHEDRINE ALKALOIDS,
http://www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/ephedra/february2004/qa-020604.html (Feb. 6, 2004).
231. Id.
232. Id. (emphasis added).
233. Id. (emphasis added).
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